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This research examines the effectiveness of resupply systems in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations by exploring different permutations of 
operational energy (OE)-focused assets and policies that a Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU) employs to improve its throughput of resources to disaster victims. The basis for 
the modeled scenario is the support provided by the 31st MEU to the city of Hachinohe 
as part of Operation TOMODACHI. This thesis focuses on OE and only considers the 
medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR) as the baseline capability. An agent-based 
simulation is then used to model the effectiveness of OE-focused resupply strategies and 
capabilities. These options include (1) efficient driving techniques, (2) reducing idling 
time, (3) hybrid technologies, and (4) follower vehicles. To investigate their 
effectiveness, this research uses a design of experiments approach to efficiently examine 
a set of design factors for specified operational plans. Statistical results indicate that the 
operational plans employing shorter and quicker vehicle convoys that communicate with 
one another are most effective in resupplying isolated victims. This research also 
confirms that the employment of OE-focused assets and policies is effective in increasing 
timeliness of resupply. Taken together, these factors contribute toward increasing the 
operational reach of a MEU conducting HADR resupply. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Given the increased frequency and scale of natural and manmade disasters, 
militaries around the world have also been increasingly deployed in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations due to their diverse range of logistics 
and medical equipment as well as their ability to deploy rapidly. Military units may not 
be ideally structured to respond to disasters, however; their effectiveness may also be 
limited by the operational reach of the delivery units and assets that they employ. The 
purpose of this research is to gain insights into the feasible operational energy (OE)-
focused capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that a Marine 
expeditionary unit (MEU) may employ in order to extend its operational reach in the 
context of a HADR resupply operation. This thesis identifies the considerations and risks 
that a MEU commander may take into account in planning for a HADR resupply 
operation. 
This thesis utilizes a large-scale design of experiments (DOE) applied to an agent-
based simulation tool called the map-aware, non-uniform automata (MANA) to 
investigate the effectiveness of OE technologies and concepts (e.g., efficient driving 
techniques, hybrid technologies, and follower vehicles) in allowing the MEU to search 
for and resupply as many isolated victims as possible in a HADR scenario. This summary 
provides an overview of (1) HADR operations, (2) the model operating scenario used in 
this thesis, (3) the research methodology, and (4) the analytical results. The research in 
this thesis is aimed at guiding the implementation of OE-focused assets in HADR 
operations. In doing so, this research addresses the following questions:  
1. What is the effectiveness of current MEU assets supporting HADR 
resupply operations in terms of throughput of resources? 
2. How do the energy requirements of current MEU assets supporting HADR 
resupply operations limit the capability to maximize delivery of resources 
to disaster areas? 
3. How do OE considerations influence the resupply options of a MEU 
conducting HADR resupply operations? 
 xx
4. What OE-focused assets and behaviors should a MEU include in its 
resupply system to improve its throughput of resources to disaster areas? 
The Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O) is interested in understanding energy-
based risk and the extent to which energy demand impacts operational capabilities 
(Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office 2016). This involves an analysis of current 
capabilities in meeting mission requirements, as well as the employment of enhanced 
OE-focused assets and TTPs in extending operational reach. Metrics obtained from this 
research will help E2O to develop a better understanding of the energy demand and 
organic logistic capabilities of a MEU conducting resupply operations to isolated victims 
in a HADR scenario.  
This research focuses on the support provided by the 31st MEU to the city of 
Hachinohe as part of Operation TOMODACHI, using it as the operational scenario in this 
study. In particular, this thesis studies the land-based resupply operations to assist 
isolated victims. The concealment and positioning of the isolated victims influence the 
logistical demand on the MEU. To answer the research questions, three measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) are identified: (1) throughput of relief supplies to isolated victims, 
(2) timeliness in delivering relief supplies to isolated victims, and (3) fuel efficiency of 
each capability instantiation. These MOEs are quantifiable and relevant to the research 
topic and are direct measurements of the success of a HADR resupply operation.  
The operational scenario is incorporated in MANA, and the resulting MANA 
model mimics the interactions between local distribution centers (LDCs), dynamic 
distribution teams (DDTs), and isolated victims. These interactions provide insights into 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the resupply capabilities of the MEU. A snapshot of 
the MANA simulation model is shown in Figure 1, with LDCs in blue “plus” icons, 







Figure 1. Snapshot of the MANA Simulation Model. Adapted from Google Maps. 
A design of experiment (DOE) approach is used to explore extensively the 
problem space in a systematic and efficient manner. In particular, the nearly orthogonal-
and-balanced (NOB) design technique was utilized to generate a 256-design-point matrix 
for the eight design factors used in this thesis. Decision factors used were: (1) operational 
plan, (2) reduce idle time, (3) fuel efficiency, and (4) communication devices. Noise 
factors used were concealment and trafficability.  
This study utilized both arithmetic calculations and two phases of 
experimentation. Mathematical calculations were first performed to obtain several 
analytical solutions in order to determine the plausibility of the simulation results. The 
first phase of experimentation utilized 40 replications per design point to quickly screen 
 xxii
out dominant factors, while the second phase of experimentation utilized 100 replications 
per design point to generate data for subsequent analysis. Data farming techniques were 
used to vary the input parameters in a systematic manner throughout the simulation runs. 
The resulting data sets were then analyzed statistically to reveal any interesting patterns, 
clusters, or outliers from the interactions between the design factors in the simulation. 
The analyzed results of this thesis provide the E2O insights into which OE-
focused assets or policies contribute most toward the effective delivery of relief supplies 
to disaster victims, and help guide the E2O in the implementation of OE-focused assets in 
HADR operations. Specific findings from this study include: (1) fuel allocated to the 
ground combat element (GCE) of the MEU may not be sufficient to support the energy 
requirements of the fleet of MTVRs in conducting HADR ground resupply operations; 
MEU commanders may have to reallocate fuel designated for other elements, such as the 
air combat element (ACE) or the MEU service support group (MSSG) to support the 
HADR resupply operation, and (2) choice of operational plan and use of communication 
devices greatly influence the throughput of relief supplies. In terms of OE-focused assets 
and policies, this research confirms the employment of: (1) trained drivers, (2) hybrid 
technologies, and (3) follower vehicle technologies as the most effective measures toward 
increasing timeliness in delivering relief supplies. Taken together, these factors contribute 
toward increasing the operational reach of a MEU conducting HADR resupply operations 
in terms of number of victims resupplied and time taken to resupply victims. 
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This study provides the United States Marine Corps (USMC) with insights about 
alternate options for incorporating operational energy (OE)-focused assets to improve its 
baseline resupply configuration in certain scenarios. Operational energy is defined as “the 
energy required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapon 
platforms for military operations” (USMC Expeditionary Energy Office 2011, 18). The 
result of this study will provide insights into the employment of new technologies and 
concepts in OE such as efficient driving techniques, hybrid technology, and autonomous 
vehicles, in enhancing resupply operations in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
(HADR) scenarios. This thesis also explores how a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) 
may develop and employ an appropriate concept of operations (CONOPS) to allocate its 
resources more effectively and optimize its operations.  
B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
With natural and manmade disasters increasing both in frequency and in scale, 
there is a greater demand for militaries to provide HADR (McMillen 2007). Militaries are 
not ideally structured to respond to disasters, however. While most conventional military 
operations are conducted only after detailed planning and usually during a period of 
heightened tensions, disasters can happen at any time or place. Military doctrine for 
HADR operations is not yet fully formed; deliverables of the mission, scope of 
operations, and coordination with or transition to civilian organizations are mainly ad 
hoc. The inherent complexity of HADR operations is also increased with the involvement 
of non-military organizations (Greenfield and Ingram 2011). Lastly, the effectiveness of a 
MEU supporting HADR operations is limited by the operational reach of the delivery 
units and the assets that it employs, as the supplies carried by the MEU may not 
specifically be configured for HADR missions (Webb 2006). To this end, commanders 
believe that the limitation of operational reach can be alleviated with OE-focused assets 
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and behaviors (Department of Defense 2016, 15). Here, we define OE-focused assets and 
behaviors as those designed to reduce energy usage or self-generate power.  
In the systems engineering (SE) process, the need to extend operational reach 
translates to a stakeholder requirement that must be addressed. In the context of HADR 
missions, militaries are essentially conducting logistics operations (Greenfield and 
Ingram 2011); HADR operations frequently involve the distribution of aid and supplies, 
transportation of relief workers and disaster victims, construction of temporary shelters, 
and administration of medical treatment. Hence, there is a need to study if and how the 
implementation of OE-focused assets and behaviors is able to improve the operational 
reach of a resupply system for HADR operations. This thesis will attempt to answer the 
main research question: Given a HADR operation, how should a MEU engineer its 
resupply system to render aid to disaster-struck locations more effectively?  
C. SURVEY OF RECENT STUDIES 
A survey of past studies on energy consumption during military operations, and 
analysis of various HADR operations, provided the academic context to this thesis’ focus 
on the implementation of OE-focused assets and behaviors in supporting HADR 
operations. 
Besser et al. (2013) examined methods to reduce the logistical footprint of a MEU 
(e.g., fuel usage, manpower, and amphibious systems) to maximize the delivery of water 
and other supplies during HADR operations. Indeed, their results showed that significant 
improvements were possible through the local production of water and the use of 
autonomous vehicles. In addition, the employment of hybrid and follower vehicles also 
showed some potential to reduce fuel usage in certain mission areas, subject to certain 
constraints (Besser et al. 2013). 
Peters (2016) identified behavioral trends that can be changed through “training 
and education, policy and planning, and leadership and communication, to improve 
individual and organizational awareness of the importance of efficient and effective 
energy use,” in order to achieve energy savings (Peters 2016, xvi). Hill and Simoncini 
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(2015) also investigated the costs of vehicle idling in the military, and concluded that 
huge savings of over $40M could be achieved by reducing vehicle idling time. In 
particular, there are opportunities to achieve increased operational reach, among others, 
through the improved use of generators, environmental control units, and vehicles. 
Alexander et al. (2011) employed an SE methodology to explore the 
“requirements to provide assistance in the form of goods and services” (Alexander et al. 
2011, vii) in the immediate 60 days of a flooding disaster to a fictional country in Africa. 
The scope of the study included constructing and analyzing alternate architectures in 
order to investigate the effectiveness of a sea-based aid distribution point, and to “better 
understand and possibly improve upon the delivery tactics and methods of delivery 
associated with HADR operations” (Alexander et al. 2011, 153). 
In the domain of modeling and simulation, Hinkson (2010) developed a map-
aware non-uniform automata (MANA) simulation model to “evaluate the logistical 
impact of enhanced company operations on a MEU” (Hinkson 2010, v). This research 
utilized a design of experiment technique called the “nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube 
(NOLH) to vary a set of design factors in an efficient manner” (Hinkson 2010, v). The 
use of MANA and the NOLH design can also be modified to explore the resupply system 
of a MEU supporting HADR operations. Similarly, Besser et al. (2013) and Alexander et 
al. (2011) constructed simulation models using ExtendSim and SimKit software to study 
the operational reach and throughput of resupply systems in HADR operations by varying 
the type/use of vehicles and other OE-focused assets. 
D. DEFINITION OF RESUPPLY SYSTEMS 
As the resupply system for a HADR operation may differ from the resupply 
system for other type of operations, it is necessary to define the logistical flow of relief 
supplies for a HADR operation. For such operations, relief supplies are gathered from 
international and regional sources, and they are sent to the affected country by air, sea, 
and ground transportation. In the affected country, these relief supplies are typically 
stored in depots for customs clearance and inspection before they are routed downstream 
to local distribution centers (LDCs), which are forward-positioned warehouses set up 
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closer to the scene of the disaster to provide more responsive resupply. From the LDCs, 
military forces and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are usually charged with the 
allocation and distribution of relief supplies to their intended beneficiaries. Here, we 
focus our study of HADR operations on the “last mile” distribution of supplies from 
LDCs to disaster victims. In particular, this thesis considers a resupply system that 
utilizes military ground-based vehicles to distribute relief supplies stored in LDCs to 
victims who have been displaced and isolated by a disaster. A typical resupply system for 
large-scale HADR operations involving international and military actors is shown in 
Figure 1. We highlight the scope of this thesis in the red box, and define it in SE terms.  
 
Figure 1.  A Typical Resupply System for HADR Operations. 
Adapted from Balcik, Beamon and Smilowitz . 
Following the SE process, a system’s context diagram defines the boundaries of a 
system in order to distinguish it from the environment. According to Kossiakoff et al. 
(2011, 266), the objective of a systems context diagram is “to focus attention on external 
factors and events that should be considered in developing a complete set of system 
requirements and constraints”; it provides for a structured and systematic approach in 
defining the MEU resupply system to be studied in this thesis. The systems context 
diagram, using an input-output model, for a MEU resupply system is shown in Figure 2.  
External sources of inputs to the HADR resupply system include: (1) international 
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sources, (2) local and regional sources, (3) the DOD, and (4) the environment. 
International, local, and regional sources provide the necessary relief supplies to the 
MEU for distribution. The DOD gives the MEU its mission orders and stipulates the 
CONOPS that the MEU resupply system has to utilize. Lastly, the environment, which 
consists of destroyed or degraded roads and unpredictable weather, affects the manner in 
which the MEU operates and the assets that it may employ. In turn, the MEU resupply 
system affects: (1) disaster victims, and (2) the U.S. government. Firstly, disaster victims 
are direct recipients of the relief supplies distributed by the MEU resupply system. 
Secondly, the success or failure of the MEU resupply mission may affect the image of the 
U.S. as a country, or of the U.S. government. 
 
Figure 2.  Systems Context Diagram for a MEU Resupply System. 
E. TYPES OF DISTRIBUTION MODELS 
1. Direct Point-to-Point 
In this model, relief items are delivered from the donor country to the disaster 
victims directly. For urgent and unanticipated operations such as HADR, the advantage 
of a point-to-point method is that disaster victims may receive the relief supplies more 
quickly. The drawbacks are that a large amount of manpower is required to deliver all 
relief supplies individually to all disaster victims, and multiple trips may be necessary to 
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deliver different types of relief supplies if there is no sorting and packaging done prior to 
distribution, resulting in piecemeal delivery. 
2. Hub-and-Spoke 
In the hub-and-spoke model, relief items are delivered to one or several LDCs in 
the affected country. Different relief items are sorted and packaged at the LDCs before 
distribution to the disaster victims. Military forces and local NGOs will collect the relief 
supplies at these hubs and distribute them to the disaster victims. The advantage of the 
hub-and-spoke system is that it is more efficient, and disaster victims are able to receive 
different types of relief supplies simultaneously. The addition of an extra stop at the hub 
means that relief supplies will take more time to reach the disaster victims, however. The 
hub-and-spoke model will be adopted as the distribution model in this thesis. 
3. Push 
In the push distribution model, the MEU’s higher headquarters (HHQ) makes 
projections of what the disaster victims will require and delivers relief items based on 
those projections. Relief items are then distributed to or near the victims’ actual 
geographical location. From an OE-viewpoint, the push distribution model is more 
resource intensive for the military forces and local NGOs tasked with the distribution 
operation as it requires the transportation of relief items from the LDCs to the disaster 
victims. It may be a necessary strategy; however, as certain disaster victims may be 
immobile or would encounter great difficulty in moving to LDCs. The push distribution 
model is used in this thesis as the amount of relief items carried by each dynamic 
distribution team (DDT) convoy is based on the HHQ’s projection, rather than on actual 
demand. In addition, the relief supplies are delivered to or near the disaster victims. 
4. Pull 
In the pull distribution model, the MEU HHQ is responsible to track disaster 
victims’ demand of relief items and deliver based on actual demand. At the same time, 
disaster victims are required to collect relief supplies from the LDCs. As the only energy 
expended in this model is in the operation of the LDCs, it is also considered less resource 
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intensive. The pull distribution model may only be employed for small areas or in areas 
where mobility is not a concern, however; disaster victims may also be unable to 
communicate their demands directly with the MEU HHQ. Hence, the pull distribution 
model may not be practicable in most HADR operations. 
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
By refining the identified areas of improvement, we restate the main research 
question: How should a MEU engineer its resupply system to render aid to disaster-struck 
locations more effectively? Specifically, this research will address the following 
questions:  
1. What is the effectiveness of current MEU assets supporting HADR 
resupply operations in terms of throughput of resources? 
2. How do the energy requirements of current MEU assets supporting HADR 
resupply operations limit its capability to maximize delivery of resources 
to disaster areas? 
3. How do OE considerations influence the resupply options of a MEU 
conducting HADR resupply operations? 
4. What OE-focused assets and policies should a MEU include in its 
resupply system to improve its throughput of resources to disaster areas? 
G. POTENTIAL AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT 
The military’s distribution capability in the form of airlift, sealift, and ground 
transportation are its most ready and relevant capabilities for employment in HADR 
missions (Webb 2006). Given that resupply requirements are ground-driven and demand-
generated with short response lead times, it is difficult to perform deliberate planning for 
resupply missions in a HADR scenario. As the destruction of critical infrastructure is a 
common occurrence in natural disasters, the MEU tasked with conducting HADR 
operations must be prepared to be self-reliant in terms of energy. In this thesis, a MEU is 
tasked with searching for and transporting HADR supplies from LDCs to victims who 
may have been geographically isolated by the disaster. The MEU commander is 
concerned with the ability to transport and distribute supplies to as many disaster victims 
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as possible, but must also consider the limited energy supplies that are available to the 
MEU; energy-efficient means must be explored and employed as far as reasonably 
practicable. Hence, the potential areas of improvement explored in this thesis are: 
1. Can the MEU locate isolated victims, and upon doing so, deliver adequate 
resupply to them? 
2. How much energy is required to carry out the resupply missions? 
3. How can the MEU be more energy-efficient in HADR operations? 
H. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study provides the Marine Corps with insights into alternate structures and 
CONOPS that incorporate OE-focused assets and policies that are better suited for 
HADR scenarios than its baseline configuration. The result of this study will form the 
basis for determining the feasibility of implementing OE-focused technologies and 
concepts such as smart power grid management, efficient driving techniques, and 
hybrid/autonomous vehicles, in enhancing resupply operations in HADR scenarios. This 
thesis considers how the MEU may develop and employ appropriate OE-focused 
assets/behaviors and CONOPS to allocate its resources more effectively and improve its 
efficacy in HADR operations. 
I. SCOPE OF STUDY 
This study is a modeling- and simulation-based systems engineering (MSBSE) 
effort that will provide insights into the impact of employing OE-focused assets and 
policies in HADR operations. The intent is not to provide quantitative judgement on the 
amount of improvement that can be achieved through the implementation of these OE-
focused assets and CONOPS. This study employs computer simulation to address topics 
that cannot be solved analytically, such as the uncertainties and randomness involved in 
HADR operations. The dispersal of victims, difficulty in locating victims, and influx of 
donated relief supplies are just some of the elements of HADR operations in which a 
MSBSE approach is useful. Additionally, simulation is ideal for obtaining insights and 
drawing inferences from new processes or procedures, such as the incorporation of OE-
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focused assets/behaviors and CONOPS in HADR operations to extend operational reach 
(P. J. Sanchez 2007).  
The first step in constructing the model is to define the system of interest (SOI) 
(P. J. Sanchez 2007). Wasson (2006, 81) defines SOI as “the system of a mission system 
and its support system(s) assigned to perform a specific organizational mission and 
accomplish performance-based objective(s) within a specified time frame.” As depicted 
in Chapter I, Section D, Figure 1, the SOI in this study is the resupply system of the 
MEU. The supporting systems include the LDCs, vehicle delivery systems, beneficiaries 
(disaster victims), and CONOPS used to employ the assets.  
The SOI relationship diagram of the resupply system of the MEU is depicted in 
Figure 3, which illustrates the different systems that are closely related and interact 
together in the context of the MEU resupply system. Thus, it is important that the design 
of any system in the MEU resupply system must consider all possible impacts that it will 
effect on other systems, as well as the possible impacts that other systems may have on it. 
These impacts may propagate horizontally to affect peer systems that share the same 




























Figure 3.  SOI Relationship Diagram. 
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The first part of this thesis will utilize an SE process to identify the: (1) 
operational need, (2) system requirements, and (3) system functions of a resupply system 
in a HADR operation. From these, system alternatives will be generated through the 
addition of OE-focused assets and employment of different CONOPS; instantiations of 
feasible combinations shall be proposed. In the second part of this thesis, a constructed 
simulation model will be used to assess the OE performance of the proposed 
instantiations in order to provide insights into the potential tradeoffs, as well as generate 
data for the analysis and comparison of the various instantiations, to guide future 
implementation. To illustrate, the “Vee” model for the SE process is shown in Figure 4. 
The scope of this thesis will address the: (1) requirements and (2) design in the left-hand 
side of the “Vee” model; modeling and simulation techniques will be utilized to 
investigate the effectiveness of the detailed designs in meeting the stated requirements 
and architecture before the implementation phase, and can be considered to be a 
preliminary developmental test and evaluation (PDT&E) for the MEU resupply system. 
The results of the PDT&E will in turn provide insights that refine the design. 
 
Figure 4.  Systems Engineering “Vee” Model. Adapted from Defense 
Acquisition University. 
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The proposed OE-focused assets and policies that are used in this study were 
provided by the USMC Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O), Headquarters Marine Corps, 
and theses by Besser et al. (2013) and Peters (2016). These include the employment of 
efficient driving techniques, autonomous vehicles, and reducing idling time, among 
others. On the other hand, the proposed CONOPS were derived from varying: (1) the 
type of resupply model (e.g., push or pull) and (2) the flexibility that a resupply team is 
given to resupply disaster victims as compared to being compelled to stay on its assigned 
search and delivery route. Using these design factors, a design of experiments (DOE) 
approach is adopted to explore the experimental space and thereby understand the impact 
of the design factors on key measures of effectiveness (MOEs). 
This study focuses on the “last mile” resupply of relief supplies such as food, 
water, and comfort items from LDCs to isolated victims. As one of the aims of this study 
is to minimize the amount of OE used to fulfill HADR resupply demands, only ground-
based assets are considered in the following analysis, as they are more energy efficient 
than air assets (Besser et al. 2013). In addition, ground-based assets are also more 
feasible in responding to the relatively small operation area (100mi by 60mi) used in this 
study. Specific MOEs include: (1) the proportion of victims resupplied, (2) the time taken 
to resupply these victims, and (3) the total number of resupply trips. 
J. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remaining chapters in this thesis are organized in the following manner. 
Chapter II presents a review of the related academic studies that have been conducted 
regarding resupply systems in HADR operations. Chapter III details the operational 
scenario used in this study as well as the considerations and assumptions used in the 
development of the MANA simulation model. This model will be subsequently used to 
assess the effectiveness of different OE-focused instantiations. Chapter IV goes through 
the development of the MANA simulation model and the simulation runs. Chapter V 
presents the results and analysis of the simulation runs. Finally, Chapter VI provides the 
insights and recommendations for OE-focused assets or policies that contribute most 
toward the effective delivery of relief supplies to disaster victims. 
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II. ACADEMIC CONTEXT 
A. LITERATURE SURVEY 
An extensive literature review of the force structure and CONOPS of a MEU, 
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) OE initiatives, MEU force capabilities, and HADR 
operations was conducted to better understand the area of research. The relevant portions 
are highlighted below. 
For greater details regarding the force structure and CONOPS of a MEU, the 
following military doctrines and documents were consulted. First, the Marine Air Ground 
Task Force (MAGTF) Logistics Planning Factors Study was used as a planning guide for 
the capabilities and resources that a notional MEU would deploy for a HADR operation. 
Secondly, the document Expeditionary Force 21: Forward and Ready Now and in the 
Future (2014) was referred to as a guide for how the USMC “will be postured, organized, 
trained, and equipped to fulfill assigned public law and national policy responsibilities” 
(Headquarters USMC 2014, 5). Thirdly, the USMC Expeditionary Energy Strategy and 
Implementation Plan (2011) was consulted to understand the expeditionary energy goals 
and initiatives/policies designed to meet these goals. Finally, the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD) 2016 OE Strategy document was studied to understand how the DOD 
plans to implement OE-focused initiatives in resupply operations. 
For analysis of HADR operations, there has been an increase in studies pertaining 
to this field as the quantity and severity of natural or man-made disasters have increased 
over the years. With particular reference to the study of resupply systems in HADR 
operations, Bergeron (2011) examines the force capabilities necessary to support HADR 
operations. He distills the 10 equipment capabilities essential for HADR operations, and 
he concludes that eight out of these 10 capabilities contribute toward the effectiveness of 
the resupply system, recognizing the main role that logistics plays in HADR operations. 
Menhart (2015) analyzes the effectiveness of prepositioned stocks toward HADR 
operations. He argues that with a shorter supply chain, militaries are able to respond more 
swiftly and sustain their missions for longer periods by not having to load and transport 
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large amounts of supplies not only across oceans and continents, but also across land. 
Moroney et al. (2013) outline the various capabilities and resources that the U.S. military 
can deploy for HADR operations. Indeed, given their inherent capability, flexibility, and 
adaptability to accomplish a full spectrum of operations, including operations-other- 
than-war, MEUs are particularly suitable to be deployed for HADR missions. Wolf 
(2003) stated that given the U.S.’s status as provider in times of crisis and the 
expeditionary posture of the Marine Corps, it is without doubt that the USMC will 
continue to be called on in the future to support HADR missions that are caused by 
tsunamis, hurricanes and earthquakes. 
B. MEU STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITIES 
The MEU is “a MAGTF constructed around a reinforced infantry battalion, a 
reinforced helicopter squadron, and a task-organized organized logistics combat element. 
It normally fulfills the Marine Corps’ forward sea-based deployment requirements. The 
MEU provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of 
limited combat operations” (USMC Expeditionary Energy Office 2011, 82). Given their 
inherent capability, flexibility, and adaptability to accomplish a full spectrum of 
operations, including operations-other-than-war, MEUs have traditionally been called 
upon to provide HADR to countries and areas that have been devastated by natural 
calamities and man-made catastrophes; at least three MEUs are actively deployed around 
the world at any given time to respond to any unexpected threats or disasters (Gastrock 
and Iturriaga 2013). To carry out its missions, the MEU is comprised of: (1) a command 
element, (2) a ground combat element, (3) an aviation combat element, (4) a logistics 
combat element, and (5) a Marine special operations company. The structure of a 
notional MEU is illustrated in Table 1. 
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 Structure of a Notional MEU. Source: Department of the Navy (2009, 1-1). Table 1.
 
 
To support a wide range of operations, the MEU carries with it a wide range of 
equipment. A sample list of baseline equipment that the MEU may carry aboard ship 
during deployment is detailed in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.  Sample MEU Baseline Equipment. Source: USMC . 
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C. DEFINITION OF HADR OPERATIONS 
Humanitarian assistance “consists of activities conducted to relieve or reduce 
human pain, disease, hunger, or deprivation created by conditions that might present a 
serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property,” while 
disaster relief “refers to the goods and services provided to meet the immediate needs of 
disaster-affected communities” (Multinational Planning Augmentation Team 2010, D-1 
C-2).  
In addition, the Naval Operations Concepts 2010 – Implementing the Maritime 
Strategy document “distinguishes between the requirement to conduct both ‘Proactive’ 
and ‘Reactive’ HADR missions” (Department of the Navy and U.S. Coast Guard 2010, 
47–48). “‘Proactive’ HADR missions include regular engagement with foreign nations 
and NGOs to provide medical support, train first responders, and complete public works 
projects” (Bergeron 2011, 4–5), whereas “Reactive” HADR missions are the U.S. 
government’s and military’s response to a disaster that has already taken place. The aim 
of “Proactive” HADR missions is to increase the capability of the foreign nations and 
NGOs to deal with sudden unexpected disasters, while the aim of “Reactive” HADR 
missions is to reduce immediate human suffering. Regardless, these HADR missions 
allow the U.S. to generate goodwill and shape positive public perception of U.S. military 
and foreign policy. Unless otherwise stated, the HADR operations studied in this thesis 
refer to “Reactive” HADR missions, since military forces are typically deployed to assist 
in “Reactive” HADR missions rather than “Proactive” HADR missions. 
D. RECENT HADR OPERATIONS 
The USMC has participated in a wide range of HADR operations. Three case 
studies are presented in this thesis due to their recent, logistics-centric nature of 
operations for the USMC units involved, and due to the deployment of an entire MEU or 
larger MAGTF in each of these operations. 
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1. Operation TOMODACHI (Japan Earthquake and Tsunami) 
A magnitude 8.9 earthquake struck mainland Japan on 11 March 2011 and 
triggered tsunamis that hit the north coast of Japan. The released tectonic force was so 
great that it shifted the floor of the Pacific Ocean by nearly 20 meters and unleashed 
seven tsunamis, the highest of which was as tall as 14–20 meters and reached as far as six 
miles inland. In total, the disaster killed almost 20,000 people, injured 5,270, and left 
almost 2,500 missing (Fire and Disaster Management Agency 2016). In addition, the 
tsunamis also caused the “catastrophic failure of the cooling system at the Fukushima 
nuclear power station, which led to the explosive meltdown of the nuclear reactor” 
(Gastrock and Iturriaga 2013, 21). Early assessments by the Japanese government 
indicated that even with the complete mobilization of their military and civil defense 
forces, Japan would not be able to deal with the disaster alone; external support from its 
allies was required to ensure a complete recovery (Wilson 2012). Thus, Operation 
TOMODACHI was stood up by the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), with assistance from U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM), to assist Japan in its time of need.  
Among other things, the scope of Operation TOMODACHI included 
“radiological decontamination, humanitarian aid airlift/delivery and reception support, 
communication support, medical aid, search and rescue, and critical infrastructure 
recovery” (Gastrock and Iturriaga 2013, 52). The USMC participated mainly in 
transportation, search and rescue, and distribution of relief supply missions. In particular, 
the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was tasked to deliver supplies and clear access 
to affected areas (Moroney et al. 2013). Among other tasks, III MEF reconstructed the 
airport and various roads, cleared debris from schools for use as shelters, restored power, 
and delivered over “189 tons of food, 2 million gallons of water, and 87 tons of additional 
relief materials” (Wilson 2012, 17). In total, Operation TOMODACHI lasted 58 days 
from 12 March 2011 to 8 May 2011. 
2. Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE (Haiti Earthquake) 
A magnitude 7.0 earthquake stuck Haiti on 12 January 2010, which left 
approximately 220,000–316,000 dead and 300,000 injured (CNN 2016). The Joint Forces 
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Command (JFCOM) stood up Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE to provide HADR 
assistance to the devastated areas. II MEF deployed the 22nd and 24th MEUs, as part of 
Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF-H), to provide HADR support to Haiti.  
The task force focused efforts on establishing sea-based operations from 
which it could manage a hub-and-spoke-style distribution network of 
relief supplies. Initial and continuing guidance for the MEUs were to 
provide food, water, and critical medical aid to those affected by the 
disaster. This was evidenced through the U.S. Southern Command’s 
mission to deploy assets to Haiti to conduct search and rescue operations, 
damage assessments, and transition to sustained HADR operations in 
order to prevent human suffering and additional loss of life. (Gastrock and 
Iturriaga 2013, 19) 
The 24th MEU utilized MV-22 Osprey aircrafts to conduct aerial assessments of: 
(1) the damages inflicted by the earthquake, (2) infrastructure, and (2) the relief 
distribution capabilities in Haiti that were still functional. In terms of supply operations, 
the MEUs utilized their rotary-wing assets to distribute food and water supplies from the 
World Food Program Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) to 16 food distribution 
points for downstream distribution to Haitian victims (Gastrock and Iturriaga 2013). In 
total, 36 tons of emergency relief supplies were delivered through the MEUs (Cecchine et 
al. 2013). Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE was one of the longest U.S. military efforts 
in a foreign disaster relief operation, starting on 13 January 2010 and ending on 1 June 
2010, a total of almost five months. 
3. Operation SEA ANGEL II (Bangladesh Cyclone) 
Cyclone Sidr ravaged Bangladesh on 15 November 2007. “More than 3,200 
people were killed, an estimated 40,000 people were injured, and 1.6 million acres of 
farmland were destroyed” (Gastrock and Iturriaga 2013, 17). In response, the PACOM 
stood up Operation SEA ANGEL II to provide HADR for the unfortunate victims, and 
deployed the “Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), the 22nd MEU, and a 
humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) from the III MEF to assist in the relief 
operations” (Gastrock and Iturriaga 2013, 17).  
 19
As soon as the tasking order was given, Kearsarge and the 22nd MEU quickly 
began supply redistribution operations on 23 November 2007, utilizing their sea, air, and 
land assets. On land, “the third MEB provided aid in the following priorities: (1) water 
distribution and storage, (2) relief supplies distribution and transportation, and (3) 
preventive and primary medical care” (Gastrock and Iturriaga 2013, 18). These priorities 
were supported by the HAST’s assessment on the ground and requests from the 
Government of Bangladesh.  
By 30 November 2007, they had delivered over 12,000 gallons of water 
and over 73,000 pounds of aid supplies. A majority of the water delivered 
initially was produced aboard Kearsarge, which had the capability to 
produce 200,000 gallons of potable water daily. Five-gallon collapsible 
bags were filled with the water, placed on pallets, and loaded onto aircrafts 
and ground transport vehicles for distribution. (GlobalSecurity 2013) 
To increase the throughput of supplies to disaster victims, USMC leadership also 
proposed setting up a secondary LDC along the southeast coast. The government of 
Bangladesh did not accede to this request, however, and only one LDC was used 
throughout Operation SEA ANGEL II (Gastrock and Iturriaga 2013). In total, Operation 
SEA ANGEL II lasted 20 days from 18 November 2007 to 8 December 2007. 
E. EXTENDING OPERATIONAL REACH 
Salem and Gallenson (2014) studied the impact of human behavior on OE. They 
suggest that reducing expeditionary energy use may offer the opportunity to “extend 
reach, save lives, and utilize operational budgets wisely” (Salem and Gallenson 2014, 2). 
The first two benefits are directly applicable to a HADR resupply mission. They focused 
on the “behavioral aspect of the Marines’ ‘ethos change’ to investigate the broad 
behavioral and attitudinal factors that may affect the overall efficient use of energy” 
(Salem and Gallenson 2014, 6–7). The authors used “ethnographic methods and 
Grounded Theory” (Salem and Gallenson 2014, 7) to collect data from actual Marines in 
actual operational environments to understand how their personal knowledge, attitudes, 
values, and motivations may vary according to different operational scenarios. In terms of 
convoy resupply operations, which is the main research topic of this thesis, they identify 
that “technology and ineffective policies and procedures have had the largest impact on 
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efficient fuel use” (Salem and Gallenson 2014, 32); potential solutions should be targeted 
at improving these two factors.  
Similarly, Peters (2016) explores the “factors that influence human behavior and 
negatively affect energy consumption in USMC ground units during operations” (Peters 
2016, 2). He asserts that “improvements to equipment and the employment of renewable 
energy systems fail to address the impact that human behavior has on energy 
consumption” (Peters 2016, v); in particular, there exists:  
A huge opportunity in implementing a behavior-change strategy to 
improve individual and organizational awareness of the importance of 
efficient and effective use of energy. The proposed behavioral changes 
may result in: (1) improved energy security, (2) greater self-sufficiency, 
(3) increased operational reach, and (4) fewer casualties from the force 
protection of resupply convoys. (Peters 2016, 45) 
This thesis recognizes the huge impact that human factors have on extending 
operational reach. Subsequently, enhancements to baseline capabilities shall include 
strategies aimed at changing operator attitudes and behavior toward OE usage. 
F. MODELING HADR SCENARIOS 
Analytical or optimization models seem to be more widely used to model HADR 
scenarios. Taniguchi and Thompson (2013) use a multi-objective optimization model to 
investigate the distribution of relief supplies to displaced victims in the city of 
Ishinomaki, Miyagi prefecture after the earthquake and tsunamis that struck Japan in 
2011. The chosen objectives to be explored were: “(1) penalty of total shortage of supply, 
and (2) fuel consumption, as these objectives were determined to be the most critical for 
the distribution of relief supplies after a disaster” (Taniguchi and Thompson 2013, 208). 
Using a “multi-objective vehicle routing and scheduling problem” formulated by 
Okabayashi et al. (2011, I-887), Taniguchi and Thompson used the “elitist non-
dominated sorting genetic algorithms method” to minimize the penalty of total shortage 
of supply and fuel consumption (Taniguchi and Thompson 2013, 210).  
Simulation models have also been used to study HADR scenarios. For example, 
Wolf (2003) investigated the potential for using “agent-based models to support logistical 
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decision-making in an urban HADR environment” (Wolf 2003, 2). To do so, he 
developed an agent-based model using MANA version 2.1 to investigate the 
effectiveness of a resupply convoy in distributing food to locals who have traveled to a 
couple of LDCs in an urban setting. Using data farming coupled with a Latin Hypercube 
design of experiments, Wolf was able to explore a very large data space in order to 
identify which input variables had the most effect on the mission success of distributing 
food. There were three entities in his model: (1) blue agents representing a convoy of 
relief supplies including a USMC security element, (2) yellow agents representing 
disaster victims who required aid, and (3) red agents representing “random harassing fire 
that could be encountered in a man-made humanitarian crisis such as a civil war” (Wolf 
2003, 6). He concluded that the effectiveness of local communications was a critical 
factor in determining success, as it increased the squad awareness of the convoys to travel 
to potential locations of the disaster victims, and it also brought the disaster victims 
closer to the convoys once they knew that a convoy was nearby (Wolf 2003). Other 
simulation methods presented by Besser et al. (2013) and Alexander et al. (2011) used 
ExtendSim and SimKit software to study the operational reach and throughput of 










This section describes the research methodology used in this thesis. First, an SE 
approach was used to identify the system functions of a resupply system in a HADR 
operation. We define different system configurations of OE-focused assets and CONOPS 
as alternatives for study. Second, open source and unclassified material was used to 
construct a notional HADR scenario that could be used to represent the last-mile delivery 
and distribution of relief supplies to isolated victims. This scenario was used to provide 
generalized insights into the interactions and potential tradeoffs between OE-focused 
assets, CONOPS, and operational reach in a HADR scenario.  
B. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS FOR HADR OPERATIONS 
In the SE process, 
functional analysis refers to an iterative process of translating system 
requirements into detailed design criteria and the subsequent identification 
of the resources required for system operation and support. It includes 
breaking requirements at the system level down to the subsystem, and as 
far down the hierarchical structure as necessary to identify input design 
criteria and / or constraints for the various elements of the system. The 
purpose is to develop the top-level system architecture, which deals with 
both “requirements” and “structure.” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 86)  
Functional analysis guides the formulation of system instantiations that will be studied in 
this thesis, as well as identifying the appropriate measures of effectiveness (MOEs). 
In this aspect, HADR operations consist of “activities conducted to relieve or 
reduce human pain, disease, hunger, or deprivation created by conditions that might 
present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property” 
(Multinational Planning Augmentation Team 2010, D-1 C-2), while disaster relief refers 
to the “goods and services provided to meet the immediate needs of disaster-affected 
communities” (Multinational Planning Augmentation Team 2010, D-1 C-2). To that end, 
the essential tasks in HADR operations include: “(1) information and knowledge 
management, (2) needs assessment, (3) supply, (4) deployment and distribution, (5) health 
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service support, and (6) collaboration and governance” (Apte and Yoho 2012, 312). The 
top-level functional breakdown of Conduct HADR Operations is illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  Top-Level Functional Hierarchy of HADR Operations. 
Adapted from Apte and Yoho (2012). 
Conduct Information and Knowledge Management refers to the continuous 
collection, organization, and analysis of real-time information in order to prepare for 
needs assessment and operation planning. Conduct Needs Assessment refers to the 
determination of the scale of disaster destruction and the scope of disaster aid that must 
be delivered to provide relevant and timely relief. Conduct Supply refers to the 
procurement, warehousing, and managing of relief supplies. Conduct Deployment and 
Distribution refers to the transport and distribution from their storage locations to their 
point of consumption. Conduct Health Service Support refers to the provision of medical 
aid. Lastly, Conduct Collaboration and Governance refers to the partnership between all 
HADR stakeholders and related security operations for the HADR operation to be 
conducted in an effective and efficient manner. 
This thesis will focus on the function to Conduct Deployment and Distribution, 
since this function typically consumes the largest amount of OE in a HADR operation. 
For the purpose of this thesis, this function shall be renamed as Conduct Resupply 
Operations for language consistency. Subsequently, this function can be further 
decomposed into three modes of resupply operations: (1) air-based logistics, (2) sea-
based logistics, and (3) ground-based logistics. This thesis will only study the impact of 
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ground-based logistics, however, for the following reasons. First, one of the most 
important tasks in HADR operations is the last mile distribution of relief supplies to 
affected victims, in particular to victims who may be displaced and isolated ; ground-
based vehicles are most adept at performing this task, while sea-based assets are unable 
to achieve this objective. Second, air assets were not considered because they are 
considered less energy-efficient than ground-based vehicles, especially when they are 
tasked with distributing supplies to small, localized populations spread over large areas. 
Third, landing zones near isolated victims may be unavailable in the immediate situation 
after a disaster, and hence air assets are usually employed to deliver relief supplies from 
the sea base to land warehouses instead. Ruggedized military ground vehicles such as the 
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), however, are still able to traverse 
damaged and unpaved roads. For these reasons, ground-based logistics form the primary 
focus of this study. 
In turn, ground-based logistics can be functionally decomposed into: (1) water 
production, (2) transport supplies, (3) provide storage, (4) perform maintenance, and (5) 
provide shelter (Alexander et al. 2011). See Figure 7.  for the functional decomposition of 
ground-based logistics. 
 
Figure 7.  Functional Decomposition of Conduct Resupply Operations. 
Adapted from Alexander et al. . 
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As mentioned in Chapter I, this thesis studies whether or not the implementation 
of OE-focused assets and behaviors improves the operational reach of a resupply system 
for HADR operations. Hence, the refined functional decomposition shall only concentrate 
on the subset of ground-based logistics, and specifically the function of transporting 
supplies. This is because the transportation of supplies consumes the most OE and is 
most impacted by the increase/decrease in operational reach (Salem and Gallenson 2014). 
See Figure 8.  for the refined functional decomposition of Conduct Resupply Operations. 
 
Figure 8.  Refined Functional Decomposition of Conduct Resupply Operations. 
C. BASELINE RESUPPLY CAPABILITIES 
From the sample list of baseline equipment in Figure 5, the relevant equipment 
that the MEU can utilize for HADR resupply missions are listed in Table 2. Other 
unmanned logistics support vehicles such as the K-MAX helicopter were considered, but 
were ultimately not incorporated into this research, as they have not been fully equipped 
throughout all MEUs.   
 27
 Relevant Equipment for HADR Resupply Missions. Table 2.
S/N Equipment Quantity
1 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 105 
2 Assault Amphibious Vehicles 15 
3 Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 31 
4 Excavator 1 
5 MV-22B Osprey 22 
6 CH-53E Super Stallion 4 
7 UH-1N Huey 3 
8 KC-130 Hercules 2 
9 TRAM Forklift 2 
10 5,000lbs Forklift 1 
11 Extended Boom Forklift 1 
12 D7 Bulldozer 1 
This thesis does not consider unmanned logistics vehicles such as the K-MAX cargo resupply 
unmanned aerial system because it has not been deployed throughout all MEUs. 
 
1. Analysis of Equipment Relevant for HADR Resupply Missions  
In an analysis of the energy consumption of MEU equipment performed by 
Besser et al. using the Marine air-ground task force power and energy model (MPEM) 
(2013), it was revealed that the operation of air assets consumed the most amount of fuel 
per platform type, and left as a separate follow-on study. Hence, air assets are excluded 
from analysis in this thesis. The results of the MPEM analysis also revealed that it would 
be most beneficial to focus on reducing the logistical footprint, fuel consumption, and 
energy consumption of MTVRs (Besser et al. 2013). Indeed, given the MTVR’s ability to 
traverse harsh terrain and transport food, water, and supplies, and that it is used by the 
USMC almost on a daily basis, it is one of the most suitable assets to be considered as the 
baseline resupply capability in HADR operations. Other ground-based assets such as 
armored assault vehicles, armored combat vehicles, and tanks were also considered but 
eliminated from further analysis due to their inability to transport and distribute large 
amounts of relief supplies, as well as low probability of their deployment in HADR 
resupply operations.  
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2. MTVR Capabilities 
The MTVR is a seven-ton truck used by the USMC for ground maneuver and 
transportation operations. It has seven variants: (1) MK23 standard cargo truck, (2) 
MK25 standard cargo truck with winch, (3) MK27 extended cargo truck, (4) MK28 
extended cargo truck with winch, (5) MK29 dump truck without winch, (6) MK30 dump 
truck with winch, and (7) MK36 wrecker. The selected variant to be used in this thesis is 
the MK23, as it is the most commonly used base model, and it contains all of the 
necessary capabilities to support a HADR resupply operation such as transporting bulk 
water and heavy equipment. 
The MK23 (Figure 9. ) is equipped with a cargo bed that can be configured to 
carry water tanks, bulk cargo, and refueling equipment. In terms of maneuverability, the 
MK23 is able to ford 60 inches of water and traverse over 24-inch vertical steps. This 
allows it to travel to disaster-affected areas where roads may be degraded/destroyed or 
obstructed by floods or building rubble. In terms of carrying capacity, the MK23 is able 
to carry up to 6.3 tons of payload while travelling on cross-country roads, which allows it 
to transport an ample amount of water and supplies. In sum, these capabilities are 
essential when operating in a HADR environment (Peters 2016). 
 
Figure 9.  MK23 MTVR in Standard Cargo Truck Configuration. 
Source: Jane’s by IHS Markit (2014). 
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D. ENHANCED OPERATIONAL ENERGY-FOCUSED RESUPPLY 
STRATEGIES AND CAPABILITIES 
In February 2011, the USMC published an Expeditionary Energy Strategy and 
Implementation Plan to “develop a plan to decrease the Marine Corps’ dependence on 
fossil fuels in a deployed environment” (USMC Expeditionary Energy Office 2011, 5). In 
particular, the plan states that the USMC aims to: “(1) embed expeditionary energy into 
USMC ethos, (2) lead and manage expeditionary energy, (3) increase the energy 
efficiency of weapon systems, platforms, vehicles, and equipment, and (4) meet 
operational demand with renewable energy.” The expeditionary energy goals and the 
expected efficiency targets that the USMC aims to progressively achieve are listed in 
Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.  Expeditionary Energy Goals. 
Source: USMC Expeditionary Energy Office (2011, 22). 
Considering the aforementioned proposed goals by the USMC, this thesis studied 
several enhancements that aim to improve the usage of OE in a HADR mission to extend 
a MEU’s operational reach. Recommendations from this study revolve around the 
operation and capabilities of the MTVR as a good proxy for the enhancements to other 
ground-based vehicles. 
1. Reducing Idling Time 
Vehicle convoys are essential for HADR resupply operations. These convoys are 
planned operations to search for isolated disaster victims and distribute relief supplies to 
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them. These operations also contribute to the most fuel wastage in terms of excessive 
vehicle idling, however. Currently, there are no pre-combat checks (PCCs) and tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for vehicle idling (Salem and Gallenson 2014, 31). 
Consequently, this has led to a mentality of “idling is just the cost of doing business” for 
Marines conducting convoy operations; without command emphasis and effective 
policies on reducing vehicle idling time, Marines are unable to translate increased energy 
efficiency to improved operational reach. Indeed, “observations captured during training 
exercises conducted at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) in 
Twentynine Palms, CA found that excessive idling was prevalent throughout the training 
environment and observed on multiple occasions. Vehicles were left idling in excess of 
20 minutes while Marines prepared for a tactical logistics convoy” (Peters 2016, 28–29). 
Failure to conduct proper PCCs and inspections also contributed to additional delays of 
more than 25 minutes while missing equipment was located . Instrumented vehicles were 
used during seven Integrated Training Exercises (ITXs) from 2013 to 2015, which 
allowed for vehicle data such as “vehicle run time, idle time, fuel consumption, and 
mileage” (Peters 2016, 29) to be captured and analyzed. The captured data is shown in 
Table 3. In particular, the idling time for MTVRs was 63.7%, which contributed to 26.7% 
of fuel wastage. The miles per gallon (MPG) without idling was 4.5 but decreased to 3.15 
with idling, a 30% decrease (Department of the Navy 2010). In reality, some idling time 
cannot be totally prevented due to operational requirements or traffic conditions; 
nevertheless, the observations and data collected indicate there are significant OE gains 
to be reaped through reductions in vehicle idling time and fuel wastage. 
 ITX Vehicle Data. Source: Department of the Navy . Table 3.
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2. Employing Trained Drivers 
Numerous studies have been conducted regarding the effects of driving behavior 
on fuel efficiency, and it can be generally concluded that “aggressive driving behaviors 
such as fast acceleration and hard braking reduces fuel efficiency” (Peters 2016, 31). 
Indeed, a “fuel management study of medium and heavy ground-based vehicles including 
the MTVR” (Peters 2016, 31), performed by the Pennsylvania State Applied Research 
Laboratory, indicated that the “impact of erratic accelerator demand and excessive 
braking by the driver had detrimental effects on fuel economy” (Crow 2014, 2), and that 
“good driving habits offered a potential benefit of 30 percent in fuel economy 
improvements” (Crow 2014, 2). In addition, experiments conducted by the University of 
California, Davis also revealed that fuel economy differences from driving behaviors may 
vary up to nearly 30 percent between different drivers (Kurani et al. 2015). These two 
studies suggest that OE usage may be potentially reduced by the employment of trained 
drivers who are proficient at efficient driving techniques. 
3. Employing Hybrid Technologies 
Hybrid technologies have been widely adopted and implemented in the civilian 
automobile industry; indeed, most major carmakers today have at least one hybrid vehicle 
in their inventory list, (e.g., Toyota Prius, Hyundai Ioniq, Ford Fusion Hybrid, Chevrolet 
Volt). This has sparked interest in the military to explore hybrid technologies as a means 
to improve the energy efficiency of their ground vehicles as well. Firstly, hybrid 
technologies employ stop-start systems to stop the engine when a vehicle comes to a stop 
and automatically restart it to resume driving, regenerative braking, and large electric 
motors and batteries to reduce fuel consumption. Secondly, hybrid technologies may also 
serve as on-board generators to provide a source of auxiliary power to operators if 
needed. This eliminates the need to keep a vehicle idling when using its attached 
components, such as the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning system, improving fuel 
economy. Since hybrid systems range from hydraulic hybrid to diesel-electric, the DOD 
has invested funds to conduct research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) 
across a range of vehicles to determine which hybrid combination is the most feasible for 
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military applications and yields the most fuel savings. For the MTVR, the Office of 
Naval Research (ONR) had engaged the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
Oshkosh Defense to produce a hybrid diesel-electric variant, dubbed the “ProPulse”—
Oshkosh Defense claims that the ProPulse is able to improve fuel economy of the MTVR 
by up to 20% (Oshkosh Defence 2017). 
4. Employing Follower Vehicle Technologies 
The USMC Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS) Roadmap identifies that UGS are 
proving to be important for current combat operations, future contingencies, crisis 
response, and HADR scenarios (Besser et al. 2013). For a HADR resupply system, 
research indicates that autonomous and follower cargo vehicles may provide the required 
operational capabilities at a lower fuel consumption rate through efficiencies from 
automated driving, weight reduction, and reduced idling time. In particular, the 
Autonomous Mobility Appliqué System (AMAS) is an add-on robotics hardware kit that 
can be installed onto any MTVR to enable it to operate in a semi-autonomous/follower 
mode. The AMAS preliminary joint technology capability demonstration business case 
indicates that follower vehicles may achieve up to 7% in fuel savings due to optimized 
and fuel-efficient automated driving cycles (Besser et al. 2013). 
E. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 
The operational scenario selected for constructing the simulation model is the 
support provided by the 31st MEU to the city of Hachinohe, Aomori prefecture as part of 
Operation TOMODACHI. Because ports were still operational after the disaster, 
Hachinohe and neighboring Miyako were selected as land bases for the HADR efforts 
along the affected northeastern coast of Japan (National Bureau of Asian Research 2014). 
The location of the ports at Hachinohe and Miyako is shown in Figure 11.  Among other 
tasks, the 31st MEU delivered humanitarian aid supplies, including blankets and fresh 
water, to affected communities along the coast (Lubin 2011). The scenario starts after the 
31st MEU’s sea-based HQ has unloaded relief supplies onto the land warehouses and 
LDCs. It concentrates on the first 72 hours of the ground resupply effort as the first 72 
hours of a disaster relief effort is critical to the survival of isolated victims; the chance of 
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survival beyond this time window decreases drastically without replenishment of food 
and water (Zeimpeikis et al. 2013, v).  
 
Figure 11.  Location of Operational Ports at Hachinohe and Miyako. 
Adapted from Google Maps. 
F. THE MANA COMBAT SIMULATION TOOL 
This thesis utilized a large-scale design of experiment (DOE) applied to an agent-
based simulation. A typical simulation used by the Department of Defense (DOD) today 
involves hundreds to thousands of inputs, with multiple possible settings (levels) per 
input and many sources of uncertainty. As HADR resupply operations are complex and 
varied (Simoes-Marques and Nunes 2013), large-scale DOE methodology applied to 
simulation is hence suitable to capture and analyze such operations. Coupled with 
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technological advances in computing power and state-of-the-art experimental designs, it 
is now possible to obtain deeper insights from large-scale DOE applied to simulations. 
Previously, DOE applied to simulations were constrained in scope due to limited 
computing resources. Additionally, haphazard exploration of simulations may miss 
important insights or worse, yield incorrect conclusions (Sanchez et al. 2012). 
“MANA is an agent-based model developed at the Defence Technology Agency 
in New Zealand by the Operations Analysis group” (McIntosh 2009, 4). MANA is an 
example of an agent-based simulation, which means that it may be able to capture 
unanticipated emergent interactions between agents, which may give rise to a wider range 
of potential outcomes. More specifically, MANA is “an agent-based distillation model” 
(Anderson 2013, 1), which means that it intends to capture only as much physical detail 
as necessary, but yet is still capable of producing required data for more complex 
analysis. Lastly, MANA is also known as a “complex adaptive system because of the way 
that the agents react with each other in the simulated environment; the ‘global’ behavior 
of a system ‘emerges’ as a result of the many localized interactions between the agents” 
(McIntosh et al. 2007, 5). Indeed, such is the usefulness and efficiency of MANA that 
there have been a number of theses completed at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
that have utilized MANA as their simulation tool, such as Wolf (2003), Hinkson (2010), 
and Cheang (2016). 
Continuous development and upgrades of the MANA model have been ongoing 
since the first version was released in 2000. MANA-Vector (MANA-V) version 5.01.09 
was used in this thesis. In this version, a vector-based approach is implemented for agent-
based movement, as compared to a grid-based scheme used in previous versions. This 
allows all distances, sensor and weapon ranges, and agent speeds to be defined in terms 
of Système Internationale units. This eliminates the need to convert real-world distances 
to number of grid squares, and provides greater flexibility in developing new model 
features (McIntosh 2009). 
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G. MANA SIMULATION MODEL 
This section describes the implementation of the operational scenario as described 
in Section E in MANA. Firstly, it describes the goals and concept of the model. 
Secondly, it presents the assumptions used in the construction of the model. Lastly, it 
describes the agents used in the model, as well as certain workarounds required to 
simulate the act of resupply in MANA, since MANA has no such predefined function.  
1. Goal of Simulation Model 
Typical HADR operations involve three broad phases: (1) emergency response, 
(2) relief provision, and (3) restoration to normalcy (Multinational Planning 
Augmentation Team 2010). This thesis will only study the land-based resupply 
operations conducted in Phase 2. Specifically, the scenario starts after a MEU sea-based 
HQ unloads relief supplies onto land warehouses. The modeling effort will help to derive 
insights on the effectiveness of OE-focused assets in supporting the logistical capability 
and throughput of the land distribution of relief supplies.  
2. Conceptual Model 
The simulation represents a distribution model as shown in Figure 12.  There are 
two types of storage entities for relief supplies: (1) LDCs (the land warehouses) and (2) 
dynamic distribution teams (DDTs). The LDCs act as a stockpile for relief supplies, 
while the DDTs search for and distribute relief supplies to the isolated victims. The 
storage entities have different storage capacities and are used to store two categories of 
HADR supplies most essential for immediate survival: (1) food/supplies and (2) water. 
For the purpose of simulation in MANA, these supplies will be amalgamated into one 
resource known as “ammunition,” and each supply entity will begin at its fully loaded 
capacity at the start of the simulation. As the simulation runs, the DDTs will consume 
fuel as they travel around the disaster area searching for isolated victims. As the disaster 
area is often damaged, isolated victims may be difficult to locate. This is captured in 
MANA by assigning an initial concealment value to the victims. The concealment value 
serves as a “stealth” factor within the simulation; the higher the concealment of an agent,  
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the more difficult it is to detect and classify it with a sensor. When DDTs are able to 
detect, classify, and thus locate, a victim, the DDTs will then be able to “shoot” the 
victim with a special non-lethal “weapon” whose single shot of ammunition represents 
the delivery of relief supplies to the isolated victim. When a resupplied victim encounters 
a yet-to-be resupplied victim within his user-defined local “neighborhood,” he will 
engage in a simulation interaction that is meant to capture that he informs the latter and 
the DDTs of the presence of other victims. This interaction causes the concealment value 
of the yet-to-be resupplied victim to go to 0%, as he tries to make himself more visible to 
the DDTs in order to be resupplied. When the DDTs run out of supplies (ammunition) or 
fuel, they will return to the land warehouses for resupply using a “pull” concept. The 
DDTs will always move out from the LDCs at full ammunition and fuel levels. If a DDT 
returns to a land warehouse but finds the warehouse in the process of resupplying other 
DDTs, it must wait its turn to be resupplied before it can receive a full supply of fuel and 
ammunition and consequently be able to move out for another mission. 
 
Figure 12.  HADR Resupply Model. 
3. Map Information 
A map image obtained from Google Maps of Hachinohe and the surrounding area 
(including the Aomori and Iwate prefectures) is used as the background map for this 
thesis (Figure 13. ). The dimension of the map is defined to be 60 miles by 100 miles 
(Figure 14. ). No relief or elevation information was used in this model as this level of 
detail was not considered necessary for this study; the DDTs must be able to traverse 
degraded roads, building debris, and forested areas to reach the affected victims.  
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Figure 13.  Map of Hachinohe and the Surrounding Areas Used in MANA. 
Source: Google Maps. 
 
Figure 14.  Map Size Used in MANA. 
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A terrain map (Figure 15. ) is used by MANA to influence the movement of 
agents in the simulation model. Essentially, a bitmap image is used to represent different 
types of terrain using a variety of colors. Each color represents a set of values for terrain 
characteristics such as “Going,” “Cover,” and “Conceal.” The values range from 0.00 to 
1.00. A value of 1.00 for “Going” means that movement is unobstructed, while a value of 
0.00 for “Going” means that the piece of terrain is unpassable. The characteristics for 
“Cover” and “Conceal” are not used in this thesis. Among the range of terrain types 
available, this thesis only uses three types of terrain: dirt, road, and water. Dirt is 
represented by the color brown, and represents building rubble and degraded roads. 
Roads are represented by the color yellow, and represent trafficable roads in the map. 
Water is represented by the color blue, and is not trafficable for MTVRs. 
 
Figure 15.  Simulation Terrain Map. 
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The simulation terrain properties are shown in Table 4. The pertinent values for 
this thesis are highlighted in red boxes. 
 Simulation Terrain Properties. Table 4.
 
4. Data Sources and Assumptions 
Effort was made to use credible data sources and reasonable assumptions to create 
a representative model capable of providing useful insights. One limitation to the study is 
the author’s non-access to U.S. classified data about the actual operations and after-action 
reports, however. Hence, most data sources are from past master’s theses from NPS and 
unclassified information about similar operations or related subjects. The E2O also 
provided data and feedback through email consultation, monthly updates, and quarterly 
in-progress briefings. Key assumptions used in the MANA model are as follows: 
1. The 31st MEU has completed the sea-to-ground transfer of relief supplies 
to the LDCs. 
2. LDCs contain sufficient supplies to resupply all isolated victims; no 
resupply to the LDCs is required in the simulation. For the simulation, five 
LDCs are utilized. The locations of the LDCs are shown in Figure 16, as 
blue “plus” signs surrounded by yellow circles. 
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Figure 16.  Location of LDCs. Adapted from Google Maps. 
3. The relief supplies at Hachinohe are used to aid survivors in neighboring 
Aomori and Iwate prefectures. Literature study indicates that there were 
about 4,000 people missing (Table 5). It is also assumed that they 
congregate in groups of 40 each, resulting in a total of 100 victim agents 
in the simulation. It is further assumed that the missing people are 
randomly dispersed across three areas in the map (Figure 17. ); victims are 
distributed proportional to the size of their homebox. A homebox is a term 
used in MANA to refer to the default location of an agent in the scenario 
map. Based on their relative homebox sizes, H0 contains 34% of victim 
agents, H1 contains 6% of victim agents, and H2 contains 60% of victim 
agents. 
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 Population Affected by Tsunami. Table 5.




Figure 17.  Distribution of Isolated Victims. Adapted from Google Maps. 
4. At the beginning of each simulation run, it is assumed that DDTs all start 
out either at the port of Hachinohe or the port of Miyako. It is planned for 
DDTs from the port of Hachinohe to supply isolated victims in homeboxes 
H0 and H1, while DDTs from the port of Miyako are used to supply 
isolated victims in homebox H2. Consequently, the number of DDT 
convoys are distributed proportionally according to the number of victims 
that the DDTs are intended to supply (i.e., approximately 40% of total 
DDT convoys will depart from Hachinohe, while approximately 60% of 
total DDT convoys will depart from Miyako). In operational plans where 
there are fewer DDT convoys than homeboxes, some homeboxes may not 
be occupied and there will be some areas that may not be able to be 
covered during the simulation runs due to time or vehicle constraints. The 
locations of the DDT homeboxes are shown in the Appendix. The number 



















1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
2 1 0 0 1 0 0 
3 0 1 1 1 1 1 
4 0 1 0 1 0 1 
5 1 2 1 2 2 2 
6 1 0 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 0 0 1 1 
8 1 1 0 1 1 1 
9 2 2 2 3 3 3 
10 2 1 1 2 2 2 
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 
5. To speed up calculations, this simulation utilizes 30 seconds per time step. 
The scenario runs for 72 hours as the first 72 hours of a disaster relief 
effort is critical to the survival of isolated victims (Zeimpeikis et al. 2013), 
which equates to 8,640 time steps.  
6. It is assumed that the isolated victims will be provided with three days’ 
supply (DOS) as an interim solution. For comparison, planning parameters 
indicate that Marines carry with them one DOS when conducting 
dismounted operations, and are also supported by one DOS by the combat 
train. Eventually, the goal is to enable the disaster victims to recuperate 
and travel to shelters set up by NGOs for further treatment and centralized 
distribution of supplies. 
7. Literature study indicates that a total of 3.1 pounds (1.5kg) of aid, per 
person, per day, is required for daily replenishment. (Alexander et al. 
2011). In addition, USAID stipulates that 15 liters of water, per person, 
per day, is required to meet minimum survival standards. In total, it is 
assumed that the amalgamated relief supply quantity is 16.5kg per person 
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per day; 49.5kg (≈ 50kg) of relief supplies are required per person for 3 
days. 
8. It is assumed that the DDTs deliver potable water to the isolated victims. 
Water foraging technologies such as water purification tablets and 
LifeStraws are out of the scope of this thesis. 
9. It is assumed that the roads are significantly damaged, and hence MTVRs 
are required for the DDTs to deliver supplies to isolated victims.  
10. USMC standard operating procedure (SOP) for convoy operations states 
that convoy speeds should be decreased to maintain convoy integrity for 
longer convoys (USMC 2017b). In general, realistic parameters for a 
convoy travelling on country roads for operations other than war are 15 to 
40 km/h (10 to 30 MPH) (Schrepf 1999). Taking 10 MPH as a lower 
bound and 30 MPH as an upper bound, and assuming a linear correlation 
between convoy length and convoy speed (GlobalSecurity 2017), the DDT 
convoy lengths and their respective convoy speeds used in this thesis are 
listed in Table 7. 











11. Although vehicle speed generally has an inverse relationship with fuel 
efficiency, it is assumed that the speed of the DDT convoys does not affect 
their fuel consumption. This is because the speeds of the DDT convoys in 
this thesis only range from 10 to 30 MPH (Table 7). Fuel efficiency 
usually decreases only at speeds above 50 MPH (U.S. Department of 
Energy 2017). 
12. It is assumed that the default sensor range of the DDT convoys is 3,000m 
as human-scale objects are resolvable as extended objects from a distance 
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of just under 3,000m (Wolchover 2012). Further, it is also assumed that 
the effectiveness of the DDTs in locating isolated victims is inversely 
related to their convoy speed. This is because longer and slower convoys 
are able to spend more time scanning the environment, and they have 
more manpower to scan for isolated victims. Assuming that the sensor 
range factor decreases by 5% for every five MPH increase in convoy 
speed, the DDT convoy speeds and their respective sensor range factors 
used in this thesis are listed in Table 8. 











13. Out of the total carrying capacity of 6.3 tons of the MTVR, it is assumed 
that the space allocated for relief supplies is 6 tons due to the need to 
transport troops and other equipment for HADR (e.g., medical relief 
equipment, and search and rescue equipment). This translates to each 
MTVR being able to carry two shots of “ammunition” representing relief 
supplies. One shot of “ammunition” is able to resupply one victim cluster 
of 40 victims. 
14. It is assumed that the default fuel efficiency of the MTVR is a constant 4.5 
MPG (Table 3). In reality, the fuel efficiency is a function of driving 
behavior, proportion of time idling, terrain, and how heavily the MTVR is 
loaded. 
15. It is assumed MTVRs move along pre-planned routes as decided upon by 
the MEU commander. An example of a pre-planned route in MANA is 
shown in Figure 18.  Images of all six pre-planned routes used in this 
thesis are shown in the Appendix. 
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Figure 18.  Example of a Pre-Planned Route in MANA. 
Adapted from Google Maps. 
16. Akin to search and rescue missions, it is assumed that the MTVRs do not 
have any prior knowledge of the location of isolated victims.  
17. It is assumed that DDTs will begin to return to the LDC for refueling once 
they have consumed 70% of their available fuel (i.e., 30% of the fuel 
capacity is sufficient for the DDTs to travel back to the nearest LDC for 
refueling).  
18. It is assumed that DDTs do not consume fuel when they are being 
resupplied or refueled. 
19. It is assumed that the DDTs will return to the closest LDCs for refueling 
or reloading at the point when they run low on fuel or out of supplies. It is 
further assumed that they will not resupply any disaster victims when they 
are traveling back to refuel or reload supplies.  
20. It is assumed that the resupply operations are conducted non-stop during 
the 72 hours due to the urgency of the mission. 
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5. LDCs 
The LDCs are used to store relief supplies; with reference to Section B of this 
chapter, they perform the function of “Provide Storage.” They may be sited at the 
location of existing warehouses, or in improvised areas such as parks or open spaces 
closer to the affected victims. The DDTs will refuel and stock up at the LDCs when they 
run out of either gas or relief supplies. To model the refueling or resupply behavior, 
MANA’s state, sensor, and weapon properties were used. At the beginning of the 
scenario, all the DDTs are fully loaded and are invisible to the LDCs. When a DDT only 
has 30% of fuel remaining, or is out of relief supplies, it undergoes a state change and 
become visible to the LDCs. This is called the “fuel out” state in MANA, but we refer to 
it as the “fuel low” state throughout this thesis. When a visible DDT is within range of an 
LDC, the LDC will “shoot” it with a special (non-lethal) weapon. This weapon does not 
kill or injure the DDT; the weapon merely triggers the “shot at” state change in the DDT. 
In this state, the DDT enters a delay (0.5 hours) that captures the time taken for it to 
receive its restock (reload of ammunition). This duration does not depend on the 
remaining supplies that it may still have on board; the resupply duration is assumed to be 
a constant 0.5 hours. Additionally, the LDC has a short-range refueling capability that 
causes the DDT it is servicing to receive its full tank of fuel. Upon the expiration of the 
time delay, the DDT resumes its default state in which it returns to its mission of locating 
victims and supplying them. 
6. DDTs 
The DDTs perform the function of “Transport Supplies” as described in Section B 
of this chapter. In this thesis, a DDT agent represents a vehicle convoy that searches for 
and distributes relief supplies to isolated victims. The DDTs use MTVRs to deliver 
supplies to these victims, and they travel in convoys varying from two to six MTVRs. In 
Section G.4.8, it was mentioned that the carrying capacity of each MTVR for relief 
supplies is six tons. As such, a DDT agent may carry 12 tons to 36 tons of relief supplies 
when fully loaded, depending on the number of vehicles in a convoy. In all, there are 30 
MTVRs available for the MEU to deploy to conduct resupply operations. As the 
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simulation runs, the DDTs consume fuel as they travel around the disaster area searching 
for isolated victims. The speed of the DDT depends on the convoy length; the longer the 
convoy length, the slower the speed to maintain convoy integrity (USMC 2017a). When a 
victim cluster falls within the sensor range of the DDTs and is seen by them, the DDTs 
will deviate from their predefined search waypoints and “shoot” the victim cluster with 
ammunition, simulating the provision of relief supplies to isolated victims. The DDTs can 
only resupply one victim cluster at a time. While they are supplying relief victims, the 
DDTs remain in place for 0.5 hours. The default state of the DDT represents when it has 
fuel or relief supplies and is on mission. In this state, it is represented in the simulation 
animation screen by a blue truck icon. Its icon turns purple when it has 30% of fuel 
remaining (triggering a state change) and turns red when it is out of relief supplies. In the 
yellow or red state, its behavior will be to move to the nearest LDC to be refueled and 
restocked. In the simulation, it moves in a straight line, perhaps through cross-country 
terrain, to the closest LDC, emphasizing the need to be refueled or restocked. After it is 
refueled or restocked, the DDT will return to its previous location to continue to search 
for victims in the vicinity. 
7. Isolated Victims 
Isolated victims may be caught in landlocked areas in the aftermath of a disaster, 
and thus be unable to collect supplies from local distribution centers. The mission of the 
DDTs is to search for these isolated victims in order to provide them with relief supplies. 
In the model, there are 100 clusters of isolated victims randomly distributed across three 
areas in the map. Each cluster represents 40 victims. The victims are unable to move to 
shelters due to a lack of supplies and inaccessible roads. As each victim requires 50kg of 
supplies per three days, each cluster will require 2,000kg (2 metric tons) of supplies. In 
their default state, the isolated victims are red in color and have a concealment value of 
50% to simulate the DDTs searching for the victims. When they are supplied by a DDT, 
they enter the “shot at” state, in which they turn green in color and become invisible to 
the DDTs so that the DDTs do not waste time re-encountering the same victim. As 
mentioned previously, isolated victims may also see other isolated victims within a user-
defined local neighborhood. When a resupplied victim encounters a yet-to-be resupplied 
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victim, the simulated interaction captures that the resupplied victim will be able to inform 
both the nearby unsupplied victims and the DDTs about the presence of the other, which 
causes the concealment value of the yet-to-be resupplied victim to drop to 0% as that 
victim tries to become more visible to the DDTs in order to be resupplied. When the 
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IV. MODEL EXPLORATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The MOEs directly address the research questions stated in Chapter I, Section F; 
one or more measures of performance (MOPs) may be related to the achievement of a 
particular MOE (Hernandez 2016). As such, each MOP is a quantitative assessment of 
the performance of a particular capability toward meeting stakeholder needs. A robust 
DOE was used to vary input factors used in numerous simulation runs to generate data. 
Input factors explored in this study include OE-focused assets and driver behavior. The 
JMP Pro 12 statistical discovery software from the SAS Institute Inc. was used to derive 
important insights regarding the impact of input factors on MOEs, MOPs, and the 
interactions between those factors. 
B. MOES AND MOPS 
MOEs are measures or metrics designed to correspond to the achievement of 
mission objectives and achievement of desired results. Good MOEs are relevant, linked 
to the strategic end state, precisely defined, observable, and quantifiable . With respect to 
the research questions listed in Chapter I, Section F, the associated MOEs are defined as 
follows: 
1. Throughput of relief supplies to isolated victims 
2. Timeliness in delivering relief supplies to isolated victims 
3. Fuel efficiency of each capability instantiation 
MOPs are measures of a system’s performance expressed as a distinctly 
quantifiable performance feature and are logically linked to the performance or objective 
that is to be realized (Hernandez 2016). Hence, MOPs must be relevant to the MOEs. In 
addition, the data required for each MOP in this study must be obtained through the 
MANA simulation model. Table 9 lists the MOEs, MOPs, and data requirements used in 
this thesis. The objective of each data requirement is also listed as more is better (MIB), 
or less is better (LIB). 
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 MOEs, MOPs, and Data Requirements. Table 9.
MOE MOPs Data Requirements 
MOE 
Objective
1. Throughput of 
relief supplies to 
isolated victims 
1. Number of victim 
clusters resupplied 
a. Total number of victim 
clusters resupplied at the 
end of three days 
MIB 
2. Probability of 
resupplying victim 
clusters 
b. Number of cases where 
50% of victim clusters 
were resupplied 
c. Number of cases where 
75% of victim clusters 
were resupplied 
d. Number of cases where 
100% of victim clusters 
were resupplied 
2. Timeliness in 
delivering relief 
supplies to isolated 
victims 
3. Lower bound on 
the time taken to 
resupply victim 
clusters 
e. Time taken to resupply 
50% of victim clusters 
LIB 
f. Time taken to resupply 
75% of victim clusters 
g. Time taken to resupply 
100% of victim clusters 
3. Fuel efficiency of 
each capability 
instantiation 
4. Fuel consumed 
a. Total number of victim 
clusters resupplied at the 
end of three days 
MIB 
5. Fuel consumed per 
victim cluster 
resupplied 
a. Total number of victim 
clusters resupplied at the 
end of three days 
6. Lower bound on 
the fuel consumed to 
resupply victim 
clusters  
e. Time taken to resupply 
50% of victim clusters 
f. Time taken to resupply 
75% of victim clusters 
g. Time taken to resupply 
100% of victim clusters 
 
MOPs 1 and 2 together define MOE 1. MOP 1 measures the total number of 
victim clusters who were resupplied at the end of three days. This is a direct measurement 
of the effectiveness of each capability instantiation toward the throughput of relief 
supplies to disaster areas; the more victim clusters resupplied the better. MOP 2 measures 
the probability of each capability instantiation in resupplying: (1) 50%, (2) 75%, and (3) 
100% of victim clusters. In addition to the number of victim clusters resupplied, it is also 
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important to measure the likelihood that each capability instantiation can resupply a 
certain percentage of victim clusters. The higher the probability of resupplying a certain 
percentage of victim cluster, the better. 
MOP 3 defines MOE 2. It measures the lower bound time to resupply: (1) 50%, 
(2) 75%, and (3) 100% of victim clusters. HADR resupply operations are time-critical. 
Ensuring victim survivability entails measuring the timeliness in resupplying the victim 
clusters, and thus, a relevant MOE as well. The less time taken to resupply a certain 
percentage of victim clusters, the better. 
MOPs 4, 5, and 6 define MOE 3. MOP 4 is a proxy measurement of the quantity 
of fuel utilized by the DDTs in carrying out resupply operations. As defined by Keeny 
and Raiffa (1993, 55), “a proxy attribute is one that reflects the degree to which an 
associated objective is met but does not directly measure an objective.” As the DDTs are 
refueled as well when they return to the LDCs in an “ammunition out” state, it is difficult 
to measure the exact quantity of fuel used because MANA is unable to account for the 
quantity of fuel that the DDTs receive in these instances. However, MANA is able to be 
configured to provide requirement (a), the total number of victim clusters resupplied at 
the end of three days. The fuel consumed can then be calculated by taking the product of 
the amount of time that the DDTs consume fuel with its fuel consumption rate in gallons 
per hour (GPH). The amount of time that the DDTs consume fuel is obtained by 
subtracting the amount of time that they are stationary from the amount of time that are 
moving. The amount of time that the DDTs are stationary is calculated by taking the 
product of the number of victim clusters resupplied, amount of time taken to resupply 
each victim cluster (0.5 hours), and whether or not it consumed fuel while resupplying 
victim clusters (binary variable “1” or “0”). The maximum amount of time that the DDTs 
are moving is calculated by taking the product of the number of MTVRs utilized and total 




Hence, the total number of victim clusters resupplied at the end of three days can 
be used to calculate a proxy measurement for the quantity of fuel utilized; the less fuel 
consumed, the better. However, less fuel consumed may not necessarily indicate success 
for the resupply operation; it is more meaningful to measure the fuel utilized per victim 
cluster resupply in order to measure fuel efficiency. This is done in MOP 5, which is a 
proxy measurement for the amount of fuel utilized per victim cluster resupplied. The less 
fuel consumed per victim cluster resupplied, the better the fuel efficiency. Lastly, MOP 6 
measures the lower bound fuel utilized to resupply: (1) 50%, (2) 75%, and (3) 100% of 
victim clusters; the less fuel consumed, the better the fuel efficiency. 
C. INPUT FACTORS 
Experiment design factors consist of simulation input parameters of interest, or 
functions of simulation inputs. The set of design factors represents the set of inputs that 
are varied via the experimental design. Generally, the input factors can be grouped into 
two categories: (1) controllable and (2) uncontrollable.  
Controllable factors, or decision factors, are factors that can be changed or 
influenced by decision makers. On the other hand, uncontrollable factors, or noise 
factors, are those over which decision makers have little or no control (Kleijnen et al. 
2005). Both decision and noise factors are included in the simulation design because both 
have an impact on output statistics, including measures of variability, which can be used 
as an indicator of risk. The decision and noise factors are listed in Table 10. Factors 





 Decision and Noise Factors. Table 10.





1 12 The number of MTVRs, and 
convoy length of each DDT, 
used by the MEU to conduct 
HADR resupply operations. 
The different combinations 
affect the convoy speed and the 
amount of relief supplies that a 





0 1 A binary variable to determine 
if the MEU adopts policies that 
aim to reduce idling time. If 
adopted, the MTVRs do not 
consume fuel when they are 
unloading relief supplies to 
victims. 
Fuel Efficiency  Continuous 3.15 5.778 The fuel efficiency of MTVRs 
is affected by employing: (1) 
trained drivers, (2) hybrid 




Continuous 3,000 10,000 The employment of 
communication devices to 
allow DDT convoys to see 
beyond the line of sight in the 
search for isolated victims. 
Concealment  Continuous 0.25 0.75 The detectability of isolated 
victims. 
Trafficability Continuous 0.5 0.75 The trafficability of roads in the 
area of operations. 
 
1. Decision Factors 
a. Operational Plan 
In Chapter III, Section G.6, it was stated that there are 30 MTVRs available for 
the MEU to deploy to conduct resupply operations. The MEU commander may choose to 
deploy all or a partial number of MTVRs to conduct resupply operations. In this thesis, 
the MEU commander has a choice of deploying 10, 15, 20, 25, or 30 MTVRs for 
resupply operations. In addition, it was mentioned that the DDTs travel in convoys 
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varying from two to six MTVRs. As the carrying capacity of each MTVR for relief 
supplies is six tons, the amount that a fully loaded DDT may carry varies from 12 tons to 
36 tons, depending on the convoy length that the MEU commander chooses to use. The 
length of convoy impacts the: (1) speed of convoy and (2) amount of relief supplies 
carried by each DDT. The longer the convoy, the slower the convoy speed; this is USMC 
SOP to maintain convoy integrity (USMC 2017b). More relief supplies can be carried 
and hence distributed by longer convoys, however. In addition, longer convoys are also 
more effective in locating isolated victims, as: (1) they are able to spend more time 
scanning the environment and (2) they have more manpower to scan for isolated victims. 
This thesis studies 12 possible operational plans generated by the combination of the two 
decision factors. The operational plans and their respective data are listed in Table 11. It 
is to be noted that due to vehicle constraints, eight operational plans (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 
12) will not cover all pre-planned routes, while four operational plans (5, 9, 10, 11) will 
cover all pre-planned routes. 






















1 10 2 5 30 12 0.80 
2 10 5 2 15 30 0.95 
3 15 3 5 25 18 0.85 
4 15 5 3 15 30 0.95 
5 20 2 10 30 12 0.80 
6 20 4 5 20 24 0.90 
7 20 5 4 15 30 0.95 
8 25 5 5 15 30 0.95 
9 30 2 15 30 12 0.80 
10 30 3 10 25 18 0.85 
11 30 5 6 15 30 0.95 
12 30 6 5 10 36 1.00 
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b. Reduce Idle Time 
Chapter III, Section D.1 explored the adverse impact of idling time on fuel 
efficiency. Two instantiations were generated to explore this behavior. If the drivers do 
not reduce idling time, the DDTs continue to consume fuel when they are resupplying 
affected victims. If the drivers reduce idling time, the DDTs will not consume fuel when 
they are resupplying affected victims. The “My Fuel Usage Rate” parameter is utilized to 
simulate whether the DDTs continue to consume fuel or not in the resupply “taken shot” 
state. The two instantiations and their data are listed in Table 12. 
 Instantiations for Reduce Idle Time. Table 12.
Instantiatio
n 




c. Fuel Efficiency 
Chapter III, Section G.4 states that the default fuel efficiency of the MTVR is 4.5 
MPG. In this thesis, the employment of (1) trained drivers, (2) hybrid technologies, and 
(3) follower vehicle technologies will cause this default value, either adversely or 
positively, to range from 3.15 MPG to 5.778 MPG. The final fuel efficiency value is 
obtained by taking the product of the MPG multipliers for employing trained drivers, 
hybrid technologies and follower vehicle technologies, with the default fuel efficiency. In 
mathematical notation, the final fuel efficiency can be calculated from 
AllMPGMultipliers
FinalFuelEfficiency DefaultFuelEfficiency   
The lower bound is derived from the employment of 0% trained drivers, 0% 
hybrid technologies, and 0% follower vehicle technologies, and this results in a final 
MPG of 0.7 1.0 1.0 4.5 3.15     MPG. Similarly, the upper bound is derived from the 
employment of 100% trained drivers, 100% hybrid technologies, and 100% follower 
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vehicle technologies, and this results in a final MPG of 1.2 1.07 4.5 5.778     MPG. 
Descriptions of the factors affecting fuel efficiency follow. 
(1) Employing Trained Drivers 
Chapter III, Section D.2 explored the benefits of efficient driving techniques on 
fuel efficiency; fuel economy differences from driving behaviors may vary by up to 
nearly 30 percent between different drivers (Kurani et al. 2015). In a MEU, trained or 
incidental operators are allowed to operate ground vehicles. A trained driver is one who 
has attended specialized motor training courses and is identified with the 353X motor 
transport driver designation; an “incidental operator is qualified to drive, but driving may 
not be his specialty in the USMC” (Peters 2016, 39). Literature survey indicates that 
“incidental vehicle operators are less likely to comply with best driving practices and are 
more prone to ‘gunning the vehicle’ during short movements and hard braking” (Peters 
2016, 39). Hence, the MPG multiplier ranges from 0.7 for 0% employment of trained 
drivers, to 1.0 for 100% employment of trained drivers. 
(2) Employing Hybrid Technologies 
Chapter III, Section D.3 explored the employment of hybrid technologies that are 
more fuel efficient; hybrid MTVRs may be able to improve fuel economy of the MTVR 
by up to 20% (Oshkosh Defence 2017). By replacing a percentage of the current MTVR 
fleet with hybrid variants, the MEU may be able to achieve greater fuel efficiency. The 
MPG multiplier ranges from 1.0 for 0% employment of hybrid technologies to 1.2 for 
100% employment of hybrid technologies. 
(3) Employing Follower Vehicle Technologies 
Chapter III, Section D.4 looked at the use of UGSs that would be employed as 
follower vehicles for resupply operations. Fuel savings of up to 7% could be achieved 
through efficiencies such as automated driving, weight reduction, and reduced idling 
time. The MPG multiplier ranges from 1.0 for 0% employment of follower vehicle 
technologies, to 1.07 for 100% employment of follower vehicle technologies. 
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d. Communication Devices 
This factor defines the employment of communication devices such as radio sets 
and cellphones to enable DDTs to send information on the location of isolated victims to 
each other, making the search for isolated victims easier and more effective. By 
employing communication devices, the sensor range of the DDTs will vary from the 
default value of 3,000m to 10,000m.  
2. Noise Factors 
a. Concealment 
This factor defines the detectability of the isolated victims, as they may be 
obscured by building rubble and forested areas. The “Personal Concealment per 
Detection Event” parameter is used to determine the concealment factor, and it varies 
from 0.25 to 0.75. Unlike sensor range, the concealment factor does not vary depending 
on the speed of the DDT convoys. 
b. Trafficability 
This factor defines how easy is it for the DDTs to travel on roads, as roads may be 
degraded or damaged due to the tsunami and earthquakes. The “Going” value in the 
scenario map editor in MANA is varied from 0.5 to 0.75 to simulate the various degrees 
of trafficability on both road and dirt. 
D. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
As the design factors are both categorical and binary, this thesis used the NOB 
design technique developed by Vieira Jr. et al. (2013) to generate the design points. A 
design point is a unique combination of input factor values. The NOB design builds on 
the work of Cioppa (2002) and MacCalman (2013) to generate NOLHs for mixed 
designs. By using nearly orthogonal design columns, the correlation between factors 
remains low (ρ ≤ 0.05), which reduces the error in the estimates of the parameter 
coefficients in a linear regression model. Similarly, the NOB design allows for the 
construction of orthogonal designs for design factors that are binary, discrete, or 
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continuous, and which have different number of levels by using a novel linearization of 
the correlation calculation (Vieira Jr. et al. 2013). 
Vieira et al. (2013) use stacking to ensure that the number of objects for each 
factor in each of its levels is equal so as to achieve balance. Balance is important because 
it allows for correct analysis of heteroscedastic experiments, such as the case in this 
research, where the design factors all have different variabilities from each other. Similar 
to the NOLH design technique, the NOB algorithm is also able to “efficiently explore the 
design space of a large number of variables in a relatively small number of runs using 
nearly orthogonal design columns” (Hinkson 2010, 39). While a central composite 
technique may also be used to generate the design points, the resulting design only 
includes extreme and center points. As a result, it is unable to fully explore the 
experimental space. By utilizing a NOB design, this thesis is able to construct the 
experiment space using 256 design points that are systematically and uniformly scattered 
throughout the design space (i.e., space-filling). The NOB design hence fulfills the 
desired balance and space-filling properties that good experimental designs should 
possess, and is suitable for this thesis where it is difficult to discern between the input 
factors and their interactions toward the effectiveness of HADR resupply operations. 
A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet tool developed by Vieira Jr. (2012) from the 
Technological Institute of Aeronautics, Brazil, was used to generate the NOB design. 
This spreadsheet tool is able to generate designs for up to 150 factors with 256 design 
points (Vieira Jr. 2012). To this end, the spreadsheet tool generated a 256-point design 
for the input factors in Table 10. The scatterplot matrix of the experimental design is 
shown in Figure 19, with each box depicting the pairwise correlation between each pair 
of input factors. It is apparent from Figure 19.  that most of the boxes are filled with data 
points, demonstrating the space-filling property of the NOB design. Boxes that just show 
straight lines correspond to input factors that are categorical or binary in nature. Even so, 
the design points span across their respective range of values and exhibit no signs of 
linear dependence. Indeed, the highest pairwise correlation between any two factors is 
0.0256, as shown by the pairwise plot of variables in Figure 19.  This ensures that the 
effects of confounding are minimized in the corresponding analysis of the data. We treat 
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the operational plan as a discrete factor for the purposes of constructing the design, but as 
a categorical factor when conducting the analysis. 
 
Figure 19.  Scatterplot Matrix of the Experimental Design. 
E. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENTS 
1. Arithmetic Calculations 
Arithmetic calculations were performed to obtain several analytical solutions in 
order to determine the plausibility of the simulation results. These analytical solutions do 
not account for stochastic elements of the HADR resupply system and operational 
scenario, such as locations and probabilities of detection of isolated victims, trafficability 
of roads, range of communication devices, and time taken to resupply victim clusters. In 
this thesis, mathematical calculations were performed to determine bounds on the number 
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of victim clusters resupplied. Across all operational plans, assuming a constant fuel 
consumption of 4.5 MPG and fuel capacity of 78 gallons per MTVR, the maximum 
distance that a MTVR can travel before it has to refuel is 351 miles. By extension, the 
maximum distance that a DDT agent, regardless of convoy size, can travel before 
refueling is also 351 miles as the MTVRs travel together in a convoy. The maximum 
distance that a DDT agent can travel within the scenario simulation time is the product of 
its convoy speed and 72 hours. In this way, the number of trips that a DDT agent can 
make within the scenario simulation time of 72 hours can be calculated by dividing the 
maximum distance that it can travel within the scenario simulation time by the maximum 
distance that it can travel before refueling. With this information, the expected number of 
victim clusters that an operational plan will be able to resupply can be calculated by 
taking the product of (1) victim detectability rate, (2) number of trips made within 72 
hours, (3) number of DDT agents, and (4) number of “ammunition” shots per DDT agent. 
In the employment of operational plan 1 (see Table 11 for details on input values), 
there are five DDT convoys of  two MTVRs each. As they travel at a speed of 30 MPH, 
they will be able to each cover a total of 30 72 = 2,160 miles within the scenario 
simulation time of 72 hours. This translates to each DDT convoy being able to make 
2,160 351 = 6.15 (≈ 6) trips within 72 hours. Assuming a 50% victim detection rate, 
negligible loading and resupply time, and carrying capacity per DDT of 12 tons (six shots 
of “ammunition”), operational plan 1 will be able to resupply 0.5 6 5 6   = 90 victim 
clusters. 
In the employment of operational plan 2, there are two DDT convoys of five 
MTVRs each. As they travel at a speed of 15 MPH, they will be able to each cover a total 
of 15 72 = 1,080 miles within the scenario simulation time of 72 hours. This translates to 
each DDT convoy being able to make 1, 080 351 = 3.07 (≈ 3) trips within 72 hours. 
Assuming a 50% victim detection rate, negligible loading and resupply time, and carrying 
capacity per DDT of 30 tons (15 shots of “ammunition”), operational plan 2 will be able 
to resupply 0.5 3 2 15   = 45 victim clusters. 
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The same methodology was used to calculate the analytical solutions for all 
operational plans, and the result is shown in Table 13. For cases where the calculated 
absolute number of victim clusters resupplied was more than 100, the maximum number 
of victim clusters in the simulation. In reality, a higher absolute number of victim clusters 
resupplied may indicate that the particular operational plan may be able to resupply all 
victims in a time of less than 72 hours. 






























1 10 2 5 30 12 90 90 
2 10 5 2 15 30 45 45 
3 15 3 5 25 18 112.5 100 
4 15 5 3 15 30 67.5 67.5 
5 20 2 10 30 12 180 100 
6 20 4 5 20 24 120 100 
7 20 5 4 15 30 120 100 
8 25 5 5 15 30 112.5 100 
9 30 2 15 30 12 270 100 
10 30 3 10 25 18 225 100 
11 30 5 6 15 30 135 100 
12 30 6 5 10 36 90 90 
 
An analysis of the arithmetic calculations indicates that, within the existing 
operational plans considered in this thesis, the plans that utilize a minimum of 20 MTVRs 
have the greatest chance of success. An additional insight gleaned was that the 
combination of convoy speed and operational plan has a larger influence on number of 
victims resupplied, than the amount of relief supplies carried by each DDT convoy. This 
is evident when comparing within the operational plans that utilized the same number of 
MTVRs, such as: (1) operational plans 1 and 2; (2) operational plans 3 and 4; (3) 
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operational plans 5, 6 and 7; and (4) operational plans 9, 10, 11 and 12. The operational 
plans that deployed shorter DDT convoys at faster speeds were more effective than their 
counterparts that deployed larger DDT convoys at slower speeds. Indeed, such is the joint 
importance of speed and convoy size that operational plan 1, which only utilizes 10 
MTVRs travelling at 30 MPH, is able to match the performance of operational plan 12, 
which utilizes 30 MTVRs travelling at 10 MPH. 
From these 12 operational plans, it is not possible to determine how much of the 
performance gains for shorter DDT convoys are due to speed alone, and how much are 
due to the fact that there are a greater number of convoys operating independently. This 
could be examined in future experiments 
2. First Phase Experiment 
A first phase experiment was performed as a means to “screen” the input factors 
quickly and efficiently, and isolate factors that dominate. This was carried out by 
performing 40 replications on the 256-point design matrix, generating a total of 10,240 
simulation runs. Each replication used a random starting seed. The first phase experiment 
took about four hours to complete on a high performance computing cluster. To 
investigate the effects of the input factors on the data response, we first summarize the 
data by computing the mean responses over all replications for each of the 256 design 
points.  We then determine the most important factors using second-order stepwise 
regression models that considered all main, quadratic, and two-way interaction terms. 
a. Number of Victim Clusters Resupplied 
The first data response to be investigated is the number of victim clusters 
resupplied, as it addresses the MOE of how effective is each capability instantiation 
toward the throughput of relief supplies to disaster areas. The summary of fit for the 
regression model is shown in Figure 20. ; it shows a high adjusted R2 value of 0.98. This 





Figure 20.  Summary of Fit for Number of Victim Clusters Resupplied 
(First Phase Experiment). 
This is confirmed by the “actual vs. predicted” plot as shown in Figure 21, where 
we see that most of the data lie close to the fitted line, with narrow confidence bands. 
 
Figure 21.  Actual vs. Predicted Plot for Number of Victim Clusters Resupplied 
(First Phase Experiment). 
The prediction profiler for the regression model can be used interactively to show 
the effect that the respective input factors have on the number of victim clusters 
resupplied; a snapshot of the profiler is shown in Figure 22.  Initial analysis shows that 
the “Operational Plan” and “Communication Devices” factors dominate the other factors 
in terms of number of victims resupplied. This is further illustrated by the effect summary 
in Figure 23, which shows that the aforementioned two factors indeed dominate all other 
factors and interactions. The model has nine terms: five main effects, two quadratics, and 
two interaction terms. Simplifying it to a model that includes only the four terms 
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associated with “Operational Plan” and “Communication Devices” would still achieve a 
high adjusted R2 value of 0.96. Through the rest of this thesis, we report the models that 
come from fitting stepwise regression without any further simplification because we are 
focusing on the largest effects. 
 
Figure 22.  Prediction Profiler for Number of Victim Clusters Resupplied 
(First Phase Experiment). 
 
Figure 23.  Effect Summary for Number of Victim Clusters Resupplied 
(First Phase Experiment). 
b. Number of Times That the DDT Convoys Were in a “Fuel Out” State 
In this modeling effort, we attempted to use weapons in MANA as counting 
mechanisms. As one example, in order to acquire a count of the total number of times 
that DDT agents entered the “fuel out” state, each DDT was given a special weapon that 
was only capable of shooting at a particular class of dummy target agent when it first 
entered the “fuel out” state.  This particular dummy target agent class was only visible to 
a DDT agent entering the “fuel out” state, and was configured such that it would never 
die, it would just keep accruing hits.  The weapon that the DDT used for this had only 
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one shot of ammunition in it, with a long reload time, such that it would not fire more 
than one shot of this type on the same instance of the “fuel out” state. Using this method, 
we intended to interpret the total number of hits on the target agent as the total number of 
times that DDT agents entered the “fuel out” state. However, we became aware of two 
examples of misfiring that made the counter-based metrics in MANA to be unreliable for 
analysis. Instead, we use an analytically-derived measure as described in Chapter IV, 
Section B for fuel consumption. Fortunately, the total number of victims served and the 
probability of serving 50%, 75%, and 100% of the victims, as well as the time required to 
serve these percentages, were not affected by this error. 
3. Second Phase Experiment 
The first phase experiment identified “Operational Plan” as a strongly dominant 
factor. This can be explained by noting that this factor controls the number of MTVRs 
used in a simulation run, as well as the speed and sensor range of the MTVRs; the more 
MTVRs used and the greater distance they travel, the more victims one can expect to be 
resupplied. At the same time, the more MTVRs used and the faster they travel, the more 
fuel will be consumed. In order to achieve a more balanced analysis, the second phase 
experiment will only consider operational plans that use 30 MTVRs; this will reduce the 
number of operational plans to four. In doing so, the effect of the number of MTVRs used 
will be removed from the model. Instead, the effect of DDT convoy length will be 
explored in greater detail, since convoy length affects: (1) speed, (2) sensor range factor, 
(3) supplies carried, and (4) number of DDT agents used to represent the 30 MTVRs. 
With an equal number of MTVRs for all simulation runs, the results for the second phase 
experiment should be less biased toward the choice of operational plan and provide more 
insights into which OE factor contributes more toward increasing operational reach. The 
four operational plans to be used in the second phase experiment are listed in Table 14. 
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1 30 2 15 30 12 0.80 
2 30 3 10 25 18 0.85 
3 30 5 6 15 30 0.95 
4 30 6 5 10 36 1.00 
 
The second phase experiment was carried out by performing 100 replications on 
the 256-point design matrix, generating a total of 25,600 simulation runs. Each 
replication used a random starting seed, and the second phase experiment took about nine 
hours to complete on a high performance computing cluster. 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
The second phase experiment involved a total of 25,600 simulation runs and 
generated a large amount of data. Similar to the first phase experiment, partition trees and 
second-order stepwise regression models that considered all main, quadratic, and two-
way interaction terms were once again used to investigate the effects of the input factors 
on the MOEs. 
A. DATA SUMMARY OF SECOND PHASE EXPERIMENT 
A basic statistical summary of the data requirements listed in Table 9 is presented 
in this section. Preliminary analysis of the raw data will provide insights into the validity 
of the data prior to subsequent detailed analysis. The histograms presented in this section 
contain data from all 25,600 simulation runs to show the range of all simulation results, 
and summarized data that show the range of potential outcomes for the 256 design points. 
1. Number of Victim Clusters Resupplied 
Out of 25,600 simulation runs, the maximum number of victim clusters resupplied 
is 100, and the minimum number of victim clusters resupplied is 12. The histogram is 
shown in Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24.  Histogram for Number of Victim Clusters Resupplied 
(Second Phase Experiment). 
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Raw data such as those in Figure 24.  can be used to check the overall range of 
results, but we are also interested in the behavior for each design point. Summarizing the 
data over replications allows us to look at the average number of victim clusters 
resupplied by design point. To this end, each design point for the number of victim 
clusters resupplied is summarized by its mean, and the histogram shown in Figure 25.  
indicate a wide range of outcomes, with a minimum mean number of 50.45 victim 
clusters resupplied and a maximum mean number of 97.31 victim clusters resupplied. 
 
Figure 25.  Histogram for Mean Number of Victim Clusters Resupplied 
(Second Phase Experiment). 
2. Number of Cases Where 50% of Victim Clusters Were Resupplied 
Out of 25,600 simulation runs, the number of cases where 50% of victim clusters 
were resupplied is 25,138, so it is achieved in the vast majority of simulation runs. For 
each design point, the proportion of replication where 50% of victim clusters are 
resupplied is computed. The histogram in Figure 26 shows that the mean probability of 
success in resupplying 50% of victim clusters is 0.98, but the least effective design point 
only achieved this threshold in 56 of the 100 replications. 
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Figure 26.  Histogram for the Estimated Probability that 50% of Victim  
Clusters Were Resupplied (Second Phase Experiment). 
3. Number of Cases where 75% of Victim Clusters Were Resupplied 
Using the approach of Section V.A.2 yields the estimated probability of 
resupplying 75% of victim clusters for each design point, and the histogram is shown in 
Figure 27. It shows that the mean probability of success in resupplying 75% of victim 
clusters is 0.70, but the least effective design point only achieved this threshold in none 
of the 100 replications. 
 
Figure 27.  Histogram for the Estimated Probability that 75% of Victim Clusters 
Were Resupplied (Second Phase Experiment). 
4. Number of Cases where 100% of Victim Clusters Were Resupplied 
Lastly, a similar approach yields the estimated probability of resupplying 100% of 
victim clusters for each design point, and the histogram is shown in Figure 28.  It shows 
that the mean probability of success in resupplying 100% of victim clusters is only 0.02. 
 72
This illustrates the difficulty of a resupply operation in an HADR scenario, mainly due to 
the dispersion of victim clusters, and difficulty in searching for them. 
 
Figure 28.  Histogram for the Estimated Probability that 100% of Victim Clusters 
Were Resupplied (Second Phase Experiment). 
5. Lower Bound for Time Taken to Resupply 50% of Victim Clusters 
Out of 25,600 simulation runs, there were 462 cases where less than 50% of 
victim clusters were resupplied; it is evident that these cases take more than 72 hours to 
resupply 50% of victim clusters. For each of these 462 cases, we replace the missing 
value for the time taken to resupply 50% of victim clusters with 8,640, the number of 
time steps that it takes to represent 72 hours. Having done that, the histogram is shown in 
Figure 29.  The reader may notice a small spike to the right tail of the histogram: these 
are the 462 cases that took more than 72 hours to resupply 50% of victim clusters. 
 
Figure 29.  Histogram for Lower Bound on Time Taken to Resupply 50% of  
Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
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Each design point is then summarized by its mean, and the histogram of these 256 
means, each of which is an estimate of the time taken to resupply 50% of victim clusters, 
is shown in Figure 30.  The results indicate a wide range of outcomes, with a minimum 
mean time taken of 9.89 hours and a maximum mean time taken of 60.28 hours. 
 
Figure 30.  Histogram for Mean Lower Bound on Time Taken to Resupply 50% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
6. Lower Bound for Time Taken to Resupply 75% of Victim Clusters 
Out of 25,600 simulation runs, there were 7,746 cases where less than 75% of 
victim clusters were resupplied; it is evident that they take more than 72 hours to 
resupply 75% of victim clusters. For each of these 7,746 cases, we replace the missing 
value for the time taken to resupply 75% of victim clusters with 8,640, the number of 
time steps that it takes to represent 72 hours. Having done that, the histogram is shown in 
Figure 31.  The reader may notice that the spike in the right tail of the histogram is now 
even higher, reflecting the increased number of cases where it took more than 72 hours to 
resupply 75% of victim clusters. 
 
Figure 31.  Histogram for Lower Bound on Time Taken to Resupply 75% of 
Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
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Each design point is then summarized by its mean, and the histogram of these 256 
means, each of which is an estimate of the time taken to resupply 75% of victim clusters, 
is shown in Figure 32.  The results indicate a wide range of outcomes, with a minimum 
mean time taken of 16.79 hours and a maximum mean time taken of 72.00 hours. 
 
Figure 32.  Histogram for Mean Lower Bound on Time Taken to Resupply 75% of 
Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
7. Lower Bound for Time Taken to Resupply 100% of Victim Clusters 
Out of 25,600 simulation runs, there are 25,007 cases where less than 100% of 
victim clusters were resupplied; it is evident that they take more than 72 hours to 
resupply 100% of victim clusters. For each of these 25,007 cases, we replace the missing 
value for the time taken to resupply 75% of victim clusters with 8,640, the number of 
time steps that it takes to represent 72 hours. Having done that, the histogram is shown in 
Figure 33.  The reader may notice that almost all the data is concentrated in the right tail 
of the histogram, illustrating that most cases require more than 72 hours to resupply 
100% of victim clusters, and it confirms the difficulty in resupplying 100% of victim 
clusters. 
 
Figure 33.  Histogram for Lower Bound on Time Taken to Resupply 100% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
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Each design point is then summarized by its mean, and the histogram of these 
256 means, each of which is an estimate of the time taken to resupply 100% of victim 
clusters, is shown in Figure 34.  The results indicate a narrow range of outcomes, with 
a minimum mean time taken of 62.47 hours and a maximum mean time taken of 
72.00 hours.  
 
Figure 34.  Histogram for Mean Lower Bound on Time Taken to Resupply 100% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
8. Fuel Consumed 
Similarly, by first computing the fuel consumed per victim cluster resupplied for 
each simulation run and then summarizing this value by its mean for each design point, 
the histogram of mean fuel consumed is shown in Figure 35.  The results indicate a wide 
range of outcomes, with a minimum of 3,687 gallons of fuel consumed and a maximum 
of 20,076 gallons of fuel consumed. 
 
Figure 35.  Histogram for Mean Fuel Consumed (Second Phase Experiment). 
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9. Fuel Consumed Per Victim Cluster Resupplied 
Similarly, by summarizing each design point by its mean, the histogram for the 
mean fuel consumed per victim cluster resupplied is shown in Figure 36.  The results also 
indicate a wide range of outcomes, with a minimum of 46 gallons of fuel consumed and a 
maximum of 245 gallons of fuel consumed per victim cluster resupplied. 
 
Figure 36.  Histogram for Mean Fuel Consumed per Victim Cluster Resupplied 
(Second Phase Experiment). 
10. Lower Bound for Fuel Consumed to Resupply 50% of Victim Clusters 
In Section A.5, it was seen that out of 25,600 simulation runs, there were 462 
cases where less than 50% of victim clusters were resupplied within 72 hours. For each 
these 462 cases, we calculate the amount of fuel that they consumed in 72 hours 
analytically using the formula presented in Chapter IV, Section B, and add it to the fuel 
consumed by the 25,138 cases where 50% of victim clusters were resupplied within 72 
hours. Each design point is then summarized by its mean, and the histogram for the mean 
fuel consumed to resupply 50% of victim clusters is shown in Figure 37.  The results 
indicate a wide range of outcomes, with a minimum mean fuel consumed of 1,360 




Figure 37.  Histogram for Mean Lower Bound Fuel Consumed to Resupply 50% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
11. Lower Bound for Fuel Consumed to Resupply 75% of Victim Clusters 
In Section A.6, it was seen that out of 25,600 simulation runs, there were 7,746 
cases where less than 75% of victim clusters were resupplied within 72 hours. For each 
these 7,746 cases, we calculate the amount of fuel that they consumed in 72 hours 
analytically using the formula presented in Chapter IV, Section B, and add it to the fuel 
consumed by the 17,854 cases where 75% of victim clusters were resupplied within 72 
hours. Each design point is then summarized by its mean, and the histogram for the mean 
fuel consumed to resupply 75% of victim clusters is shown in Figure 38.  The results 
indicate a wide range of outcomes, with a minimum mean fuel consumed of 2,592 
gallons and a maximum mean fuel consumed of 15,818 gallons to resupply 75% of 
victim clusters. 
 
Figure 38.  Histogram for Mean Lower Bound Fuel Consumed to Resupply 75% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
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12. Lower Bound for Fuel Consumed to Resupply 100% of Victim 
Clusters 
In Section A.7, it was seen that out of 25,600 simulation runs, there were 25,007 
cases where less than 100% of victim clusters were resupplied within 72 hours. For each 
these 25,007 cases, we calculate the amount of fuel that they consumed in 72 hours 
analytically using the formula presented in Chapter IV, Section B, and add it to the fuel 
consumed by the 593 cases where 100% of victim clusters were resupplied within 72 
hours. Each design point is then summarized by its mean, and the histogram for the mean 
fuel consumed to resupply 100% of victim clusters is shown in Figure 39.  The results 
indicate a wide range of outcomes, with a minimum mean fuel consumed of 3,687 
gallons and a maximum mean fuel consumed of 20,379 gallons to resupply 100% of 
victim clusters. 
 
Figure 39.  Histogram for Mean Lower Bound Fuel Consumed to Resupply 100% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
B. ANALYSIS OF SECOND PHASE EXPERIMENT 
Partition tree models were used to investigate the effects of the input factors on 
the MOEs as identified in Chapter IV, Section B. Partition tree models are a 
“nonparametric approach to fitting a response to a set of data” (Kleijnen et al. 2005, 284), 
and are a relatively intuitive way of exploring the effect of input variables on a response 
variable. A partition tree model is constructed by splitting the simulation data recursively 
into groups with different means and lower standard deviations (branches) until a desired 
R2 value is achieved. The higher the R2 value, the more variability in the data that is 
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explained by the partition tree model, and thus the better the model fit. In the subsequent 
analysis, the partition tree models were constructed using average results across the 
replications for each design point.  
1. Throughput of Relief Supplies to Isolated Victims 
The first MOE to be investigated is the throughput of relief supplies to isolated 
victims, and a partition tree was constructed using the number of victim clusters 
resupplied as the response, as shown in Figure 40.  The findings reveal that shorter and 
faster DDT convoys that are able to communicate with one another are more effective 
toward the throughput of relief supplies to isolated victims. Interestingly, the first split 
was on the “Communications Devices” factor, and not the “Operational Plan” factor as in 
the first phase experiment. This shows that the screening efforts to remove dominant 
factors were effective for this MOE. Specifically, when the use of communication 
devices is able to increase the sensor range to more than 4,455 meters, the mean number 
of victim clusters resupplied is 84.79. This finding shows that the use of communications 
devices is crucial in passing on valuable information between DDT convoys searching for 
isolated victims; the farther the range of the sensor, the better.  
The second split divided the “Operational Plan” factor into operational plan 4 
against operational plans 1, 2, and 3. In this case, when operational plan 4 was utilized, 
the mean number of victims resupplied is 73.25. When operational plans 1, 2, and 3 were 
utilized, the mean number of victim clusters resupplied is 88.87. With reference to the 
DDT convoy length of the different operational plans shown in Table 14, this finding 
reveals that operational plans with shorter and faster convoys are more effective in 
resupplying isolated victims. This could be due to the fact that shorter convoys translate 
to a greater number of DDT agents exploring more areas of the map simultaneously; at 
the same time, they are also able to travel quicker to LDCs for reloading, hence 
minimizing the penalty of running out of relief supplies more frequently. 
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Figure 40.  Partition Tree for Number of Victim Clusters Resupplied 
(Second Phase Experiment). 
A second-order stepwise regression model for the number of victim clusters 
resupplied was constructed to explore the interactions between the factors, and the 
interaction profiles for the input factors that affect the number of victim clusters 
resupplied is shown in Figure 41.  On the interaction plot of “Fuel Efficiency” and 
“Trafficability,” we see that when trafficability is bad (0.5), an increase in fuel efficiency 
increases the number of victims resupplied. On the interaction plot of “Fuel Efficiency” 
and “Operational Plan,” we see that an increase in fuel efficiency is able to increase the 
number of victim clusters resupplied in operational plan 4, which is the case where the 
speed of the DDTs was the slowest. This demonstrates that fuel efficiency becomes a 
concern in situations where the trafficability of roads is bad or when the DDT convoys 
are slow; fuel efficiency does not have as much of an impact in situations where the 
trafficability of roads is good or when the DDT convoys are fast. The reader is reminded 
that fuel efficiency is not affected by the speed of the DDTs due to their relatively low 
speed; this was explained earlier in Chapter III, Section G.4.11. 
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Figure 41.  Interaction Profiles for Input Factors that Affect the Number of 
Victim Clusters Resupplied (Second Phase Experiment). 
2. Timeliness in Delivering Relief Supplies to Isolated Victims 
The second MOE to be investigated is the timeliness in delivering relief supplies 
to isolated victims. Three partition trees were constructed, using the lower bound time 
taken to resupply: (1) 50%, (2) 75%, and (3) 100% of victim clusters, respectively, as the 
responses. The effects summary table is shown in Table 15, with detailed explanation in 
Sections a, b, and c. 
 Effects Summary Table for Partition Trees for Lower Bound Time Taken Table 15.
to Resupply 50/75/100% of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
Input Factors 
Lower Bound for Time Taken to Resupply 
50% of Victims 75% of victims 100% of Victims
Operational Plan √ √ √ 
Reduce Idle Time - - - 
Fuel Efficiency - - - 
Communication Devices - √ √ 
R2 of Partition Tree 0.831 0.791 0.640 
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a. Lower Bound for Time Taken to Resupply 50% of Victim Clusters 
The “Operation Plan” factor had the greatest effect on the lower bound time taken 
to resupply 50% of victim clusters. As shown in the partition tree in Figure 42, the first 
split was on the “Operational Plan” factor. Subsequent splits in the partition tree were 
similar, splitting at the different operational plans. Specifically, operational plan 1 took 
the least amount of time at 11.72 hours, while operational plan 4 took the most amount of 
time at 39.82 hours. This shows that the “Operational Plan” factor strongly affects the 
time taken to resupply 50% of victim clusters. In particular, operational plans that utilize 
shorter and faster convoys were able to resupply 50% of victim clusters the quickest. 
 
Figure 42.  Partition Tree for Lower Bound Time Taken to Resupply 50% of 
Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
b. Lower Bound for Time Taken to Resupply 75% of Victim Clusters 
Both “Operational Plan” and “Communication Devices” factors had a large effect 
on the lower bound time taken to resupply 75% of victim clusters. Similar to Section 
B.2.a, the first split divided the “Operational Plan” factor into operational plans 1 and 2 
against operational plans 3 and 4. The second split divided the “Communication Devices” 
factor for operational plans 1 and 2. These findings show that shorter and faster DDT 
convoys that are adept at communicating across long distances (≥ 4,675 meters) are able  
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to resupply 75% of victim clusters in the shortest amount of time at 23.62 hours. The 
partition tree for the time taken to resupply 75% of victim clusters is shown in Figure 43.  
 
Figure 43.  Partition Tree for Lower Bound Time Taken to Resupply 75% of 
Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
c. Lower Bound for Time Taken to Resupply 100% of Victim Clusters 
Both “Operational Plan” and “Communication Devices” factors had a large effect 
on the lower bound time taken to resupply 100% of victim clusters. As shown in the 
partition tree in Figure 44, both the first and second splits were on the “Communication 
Device” factor. The third split was on the “Operational Plan” factor. These findings show 
that shorter and faster DDT convoys that are adept at communicating across long 
distances (≥ 8,518 meters) are able to resupply 100% of victim clusters quickest. 
However, the time taken to resupply 100% of victim clusters do not differ much between 
the different leaves of the partition tree, with the shortest amount of time at 68.23 hours, 
and the most amount of time at 72 hours. This shows that: (1) both “Operational Plan” 
and “Communication Devices” factors strongly affect the time taken to resupply 100% of 
victim clusters, and (2) a certain minimum time duration is required if 100% of victim 
clusters are to be resupplied. 
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Figure 44.  Partition Tree for Lower Bound Time Taken to Resupply 100% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
3. Fuel Efficiency of Each Capability Instantiation 
The third MOE to be investigated is the fuel efficiency of each capability 
instantiation. Five partition trees were constructed, using: (1) fuel consumed, (2) fuel 
consumed per victim cluster resupplied, and the lower bound fuel consumed to resupply 
(3) 50%, (4) 75%, and (5) 100% of victim clusters, as the responses. The effects 
summary table for the lower bound fuel consumed to resupply 50/75/100% of victim 
clusters is shown in Table 16, with detailed explanation in Sections c, d, and e. 
 Effects Summary Table for Partition Trees for Lower Bound Fuel Consumed Table 16.
to Resupply 50/75/100% of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment) 
Input Factors 
Lower Bound for Fuel Consumed to Resupply 
50% of Victims 75% of victims 100% of Victims
Operational Plan - √ √ 
Reduce Idle Time √ - - 
Fuel Efficiency √ √ √ 
Communication Devices √ √ - 
R2 of Partition Tree 0.61 0.77 0.87 
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a. Fuel Consumed 
Both “Operational Plan” and “Fuel Efficiency” factors have a large effect on the 
amount of fuel consumed. As shown in the partition tree in Figure 45, the first split is on 
the “Operational Plan” factor, and the second split is on the “Fuel Efficiency” factor. This 
finding shows that the shorter and faster DDT convoys (13,660 gallons) consumed 
approximately 2.3 times more fuel than longer and slower DDT convoys (5,903 gallons), 
presumably because collectively, they covered more distance and consumed fuel at a 
quicker rate. However, by improving on the fuel efficiency of the MTVRs (≥ 4.26), the 
shorter and faster DDT convoys can reduce their fuel consumption. 
 
Figure 45.  Partition Tree for Fuel Consumed (Second Phase Experiment). 
b. Fuel Consumed Per Victim Cluster Resupplied 
Similarly, both “Operational Plan” and “Fuel Efficiency” factors have a large effect 
on the amount of fuel consumed per victim cluster resupplied. As shown in the partition 
tree in Figure 46, the first split is on the “Operational Plan” factor, and the second and third 
splits are on the “Fuel Efficiency” factor. This finding shows that the shorter and faster 
DDT convoys (159 gallons) consumed approximately two times more fuel than longer and 
slower DDT convoys (81 gallons) per victim cluster resupplied. It was also observed that as 
a whole, longer and slower DDT convoys with worse fuel efficiencies (less than 3.93) 
consumed less fuel (101 gallons vs. 138 gallons) as compared to shorter and faster DDT 
convoys with better fuel efficiencies (≥ 4.28) per victim cluster resupplied.  
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Figure 46.  Partition Tree for Fuel Consumed Per Victim Cluster Resupplied 
(Second Phase Experiment). 
c. Lower Bound for Fuel Consumed to Resupply 50% of Victim Clusters 
The “Fuel Efficiency,” “Communication Devices,” and “Reduce Idle Time” 
factors have a large effect on the lower bound fuel consumed to resupply 50% of victim 
clusters. As shown in the partition tree in Error! Reference source not found., the first 
split is on the “Fuel Efficiency” factor, and the second and third splits are on the 
“Communication Devices” factor. This finding shows that fuel efficient MTVRs (≥ 4.31) 
that are able to communicate with one another over relatively long distances (≥ 3,824 
meters) and reduced idling time when resupplying victim clusters consume the least fuel 
(2,078 gallons), presumably because the DDT convoys do not have to travel 
unnecessarily searching for victim clusters to resupply them. On the other hand, DDT 
convoys that are only able to communicate with one another over short distances (lesser 
than 3,165 meters) consume the most fuel (3,387 gallons).  For less fuel efficient MTVRs 
(less than 4.31), the amount of fuel consumed to resupply 50% of victim clusters is 
affected by the noise factors “Trafficability” and “Concealment.” As the “Operational 
Plan” factor does not appear in this partition tree, it suggests that all four operational 




Figure 47.  Partition Tree for Lower Bound Fuel Consumed to Resupply 50% of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment)
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d. Lower Bound for Fuel Consumed to Resupply 75% of Victim Clusters 
The “Communication Devices,” “Fuel Efficiency,” and “Operational Plan” factors 
have the largest effect on the lower bound fuel consumed to resupply 75% of victim 
clusters. As shown in the partition tree in Figure 48, the first split was on the 
“Communication Devices” factor, while the second and third splits were on the “Fuel 
Efficiency” and “Operational Plan” factors respectively. The right hand of the partition 
tree suggests that when the DDT convoys are not able to communicate with one another 
over long distances (less than 4,729 meters), utilizing shorter and faster DDT convoys 
will lead to a greater amount of fuel consumed to resupply 75% of victim clusters, 
presumably because without effective communications, they are mostly operating as 
independent entities, driving around searching for victim clusters and consuming more 
fuel in the process. 
 
Figure 48.  Partition Tree for Lower Bound Fuel Consumed to Resupply 75% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
e. Lower Bound for Fuel Consumed to Resupply 100% of Victim Clusters 
The “Operational Plan” and “Fuel Efficiency” factors have the largest effect on 
the lower bound fuel consumed to resupply 100% of victim clusters. As shown in the 
partition tree in Figure 49, the first split was on the “Operational Plan” factor, and the 
second split was on the “Fuel Efficiency” factor. Subsequent splits in the partition tree 
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were similar to the first two splits, alternating between the “Operational Plan” and “Fuel 
Efficiency” factors. The findings show that across the range, longer and slower DDT 
convoys consumed lesser fuel to resupply 100% of victim clusters as compared to shorter 
and faster DDT convoys. 
 
Figure 49.  Partition Tree for Lower Bound Fuel Consumed to Resupply 100% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
4. Tradeoff Between Fuel Consumed and Timeliness in Delivering 
Supplies to Victim Clusters 
To explore the tradeoff between MOE 2—time taken to resupply victim clusters 
and MOE 3—fuel efficiency of each capability instantiation, the amount of fuel 
consumed to resupply: (1) 50%, (2) 75%, and (3) 100% of victim clusters was plotted 
against the time taken to resupply its corresponding percentage of victim clusters.  
a. Fuel Consumed vs. Time Taken to Resupply 50% of Victim Clusters 
In Figure 50, we see that most runs are able to resupply 50% of victim clusters 
within 72 hours., as there were not many censored runs which lie on the end of simulation 
reference line. In particular, we observe that when holding the lower bound on fuel 
constant at low levels (e.g., 5,000 gallons), the runs corresponding to operational plans 
that utilized shorter and faster DDT convoys were able to resupply 50% of victim clusters 
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the quickest, while the runs corresponding to operational plans that utilized longer and 
slower DDT convoys were slower at resupplying 50% of victim clusters. In addition, we 
notice at the top right area of the graph that there are instances where operational plans 
that utilized shorter and faster DDT convoys consumed more fuel than operational plans 
that utilized longer and slower DDT convoys  
 
Figure 50.  Graph for Fuel Consumed vs. Time Taken to Resupply 50% of 
Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
b. Fuel Consumed vs. Time Taken to Resupply 75% of Victim Clusters 
In Figure 51, we see that there are more censored runs that lie on the end of 
simulation reference line, indicating that there are lesser runs that are able to resupply 
75% of victim clusters within 72 hours. In particular, we observe that most runs 
corresponding to operational plans that utilized shorter and faster DDT convoys were 
able to resupply 75% of victim clusters the quickest, but the runs corresponding to these 
operational plans also consumed more fuel, as shown by the different layers in the graph, 
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with operational plan 1 consuming the most fuel and operational plan 4 consuming the 
least fuel. 
 
Figure 51.  Graph for Fuel Consumed vs. Time Taken to Resupply 75% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment). 
c. Fuel Consumed vs. Time Taken to Resupply 100% of Victim Clusters 
In Figure 52, we see that there are many censored runs that lie on the end of 
simulation reference line, indicating that they are unable to resupply 100% of victim 
clusters within 72 hours. For the runs that are able to do so, we observe that runs 
corresponding to operational plans that utilize shorter and faster DDT convoys consume 
more fuel than runs corresponding to operational plans that utilize longer and slower 
DDT convoys, albeit that some of the runs in the former are able to resupply 100% of 
victim clusters quicker than the latter. Operational plan 4 was never observed to resupply 
100% of victim clusters within 72 hours, regardless of the values of the other factors. 
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Figure 52.  Graph for Fuel Consumed vs. Time Taken to Resupply 100% 
of Victim Clusters (Second Phase Experiment) 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this thesis was to study the effect of several OE-focused enhancements 
in extending the operational reach of a MEU in a HADR mission. This chapter restates 
the research questions originally listed in Chapter I, Section F, and provides insights that 
directly answer the questions. 
A. ANALYTICAL INSIGHTS 
The research questions and their respective insights are presented here. 
1. What Is the Effectiveness of Current MEU Assets Supporting HADR 
Resupply Operations in Terms of Throughput of Resources? 
The research shows that current MEU assets are able to support HADR resupply 
operations, but with a varying degree of success depending on the specific operational 
plan utilized as well as the “noise” factors examined in this thesis. This is evident in the 
wide range of number of victims resupplied, which ranged from a minimum of 12 to a 
maximum of 100 (Figure 24. ). The effectiveness depends on the operational plan 
employed by the MEU commander and the use of communication devices between the 
DDT convoys. If the MEU commander is restricted to the four operational plans studied, 
he or she should utilize operational plans consisting of shorter and more numerous DDT 
convoys that are able to travel independently, and at higher speed. Since DDT convoys 
are able to operate independently from each other, the use of communication devices 
allows them to quickly develop an operational picture of the HADR “battlespace.” As a 
result, the DDT convoys are able to spend less time searching for isolated victims; rather, 
they are able to use the time saved to deliver relief supplies to a greater number of 
victims. 
2. How Do the Energy Requirements of Current MEU Assets 
Supporting HADR Resupply Operations Limit its Capability to 
Maximize Delivery of Resources to Disaster Areas? 
Not surprisingly, the research shows that the “Fuel Efficiency” factor has a strong 
influence on all the MOPs associated with the MOE of fuel efficiency of each capability 
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instantiation. From Chapter V, Section A.8, the approximate amount of fuel consumed by 
a fleet of 30 MTVRs conducting HADR resupply operations over three days ranged from 
3,687 gallons to 20,076 gallons. According to the Center of Naval Analyses, the daily 
fuel requirement for the MEU ground combat element (GCE) is 6,546 gallons based on 
assault requirements (Table 17); assault requirements are used because they are similar to 
the first 72 hours of the ground resupply effort studied in this thesis. Hence, the total 
amount of fuel that is allocated to the GCE for three days of operations is 19,638 gallons, 
and the fuel consumed by the HADR resupply operation represents 18.77% to 102.23% 
of the total three-day quota. It is likely that the energy requirement of the MTVRs 
conducting HADR resupply operations may hamper its capability to maximize delivery 
of resources to disaster areas, and MEU commanders may have to reallocate fuel 
designated for other elements, such as the air combat element (ACE) or the MEU service 
support group (MSSG) to support the HADR resupply operation. 
 Daily Fuel Requirement for MEU. Adapted from Webb (2006, II-52). Table 17.
 
In terms of fuel consumed per victim cluster resupplied, analysis indicates that 
longer convoys traveling at slower speed perform better than smaller convoys traveling at 
higher speed (i.e., longer convoys are able to resupply more victim clusters per unit fuel 
consumed). Should energy sources be limited, one possibility is to deploy longer and 
slower convoys for HADR resupply missions to conserve energy. Alternatively, the 
tradeoff analysis indicates that shorter and faster convoys can also be utilized, albeit for a 
shorter period of time. 
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3. How Do OE Considerations Influence the Resupply Options of a 
MEU Conducting HADR Resupply Operations? 
Generally, most of the OE-focused assets and policies tested via the MANA 
simulation had a positive effect on the MOEs, and should be considered for future 
implementation to extend operational reach. Although not an OE consideration, a general 
insight gleaned from the research indicates that the “Operational Plan” factor has a strong 
influence on the MOEs and MOPs as it was present in all of the partition tree models. 
Hence, MEU commanders are recommended to place more emphasis on the operational 
plans considered for employment in a HADR resupply mission, in order to ensure greater 
probability of mission success. 
Conversely, it was observed that the “Reduce Idle Time” factor only had a limited 
effect on the MOEs relative to the other factors. This may be because it only affects the 
situation when the DDT convoys are resupplying victims. The relatively short time span 
of 0.5 hours to resupply a victim cluster means that the “Reduce Idle Time” factor was 
not able to significantly affect any of the MOEs. Nonetheless, it directly saves a small 
amount of fuel. A suggested improvement is to allow the “Reduce Idle Time” factor to 
also affect the situation when the DDT convoys are being restocked at the LDC, or to 
insert a penalty for vehicle idling before moving out from a LDC to account for PCCs; 
these practices are prohibited but still commonly practiced in reality (Peters 2016).  
4. What OE-focused Assets and Policies Should a MEU Include in Its 
Resupply System to Improve Its Throughput of Resources to Disaster 
Areas? 
This research reveals that the “Fuel Efficiency” factor had a significant effect on 
MOE 3 (fuel efficiency of each capability instantiation). Hence, the OE-focused assets 
and policies that the MEU should include in its resupply system should be those that 
pertain to the “Fuel Efficiency” factor, such as: (1) employing trained drivers, (2) 
employing hybrid technologies, and (3) employing follower vehicle technologies. 
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B. LIMITATIONS 
A limitation of using MANA as the choice of simulation software in this thesis is 
that MANA is only able to have one “ammunition” counter to account for a variety of 
relief supplies. For scenarios that involve several resupply items, it would be better to 
consider other simulation software such as Pythagoras, which is able to account for four 
different types of supplies. In addition, MANA has no predefined function for the act of 
resupply, so certain workarounds had to be performed in order to implement the scenario 
in MANA.  
C. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
Due to security concerns, the MANA model was constructed using open source 
and unclassified material. Future work could improve upon the fidelity of the model by 
incorporating additional information obtained from the DOD, defense agencies and 
contractors, or other classified sources.  
Sources of information notwithstanding, the MANA model developed in this 
thesis could also be used to explore the implementation of breaking-edge capabilities and 
technologies in HADR operations to extend operational reach, such as foraging 
techniques, water purification capabilities, unmanned technologies, and solar power. By 
changing the terrain and background map, and adjusting for specific differences, the 
MANA model could also be adapted to explore other operational scenarios such as 
Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE and Operation SEA ANGEL II.    
Lastly, future experiments could explore variations to the “Operational Plan” 
factor, since it was identified as one of the most dominant factors. For example, the linear 
relationship between convoy size and speed can be relaxed to allow for shorter and 
slower convoys, as well as longer and faster convoys.  
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APPENDIX.  DDT PRE-PLANNED ROUTES 
This appendix contains the six pre-planned routes on which the MEU commander 
may choose to deploy the DDT convoys in this thesis (Figures 52 to 57). 
 
Figure 53.  Pre-planned Route 1. Adapted from Google Maps. 
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Figure 54.  Pre-planned Route 2. Adapted from Google Maps. 
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Figure 55.  Pre-planned Route 3. Adapted from Google Maps. 
 100
 
Figure 56.  Pre-planned Route 4. Adapted from Google Maps. 
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Figure 57.  Pre-planned Route 5. Adapted from Google Maps. 
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Figure 58.  Pre-planned Route 6. Adapted from Google Maps. 
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